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Abstract
The French labor market is divided between workers in permanent jobs and those who al-
ternate fixed-term contracts with unemployment spells. Among other public policies aiming
at reducing this duality, financial incentives could induce employers to lengthen contract
duration or favor permanent contracts. This article develops a matching model fitted to the
French labor-market characteristics and calibrated on French data. A gradual decrease in
unemployment contributions or a firing tax reduces the duality but increases market rigidity
and lowers labor productivity. However, decreasing unemployment contributions gradually is
less favorable for new entrants than a firing tax and lengthens unemployment spells. An addi-
tional contribution levied on short-term contracts to finance a bonus for permanent-contract
hirings also decreases labor-market duality and increases activity but without negative im-
pacts on labor-market flexibility and productivity.
JEL Codes: J41, J42, J48 Keywords: Duality, public policies
Résumé
Le marché du travail français est segmenté entre les personnes bénéficiant d’un emploi sta-
ble et celles alternant contrats temporaires et périodes de chômage. Parmi les solutions
envisagées pour réduire cette dualité figurent des incitations financières pour encourager les
entreprises à allonger la durée des contrats ou favoriser le recours aux emplois stables. Cet
article développe un modèle d’appariement adapté aux caractéristiques du marché du tra-
vail français et calibré sur données françaises. Les conclusions suivantes apparaissent : des
cotisations dégressives avec l’ancienneté dans le contrat ou une taxe sur les licenciements et
sur les fins de contrats temporaires réduisent la segmentation mais au prix d’une plus forte
rigidité du marché du travail et d’une plus faible productivité ; par rapport à la taxe, des
cotisations dégressives sont moins favorables aux nouveaux entrants et augmentent plus la
durée moyenne de chômage ; une surcotisation sur les emplois temporaires, finançant une
prime aux embauches en emploi stable, diminue également la segmentation du marché du
travail mais elle n’a pas les mêmes effets négatifs sur la flexibilité du marché du travail et
la productivité. De ce point de vue les réformes récentes en Italie et en France apparaissent
pertinentes.
Mots clés : Segmentation, politiques publiques
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1 Introduction
The French labor market is divided between workers in stable jobs and those who alter-
nate fixed-term contracts with unemployment spells. This lack of job stability particularly
concerns precarious populations such as unskilled workers, young people, mothers of young
children, and second-generation immigrants. This situation is not specific to France, but is
also observed in countries of Southern Europe. The economic literature1 shows that the phe-
nomenon could be related to labor-market institutions and the gap between the employment
protection of permanent and fixed-term contracts. Two major articles deal with this topic
in France. Blanchard and Landier (2002) show the negative effect of fixed (i.e., short-term)
contracts (Contrats à Durée Déterminée: CDDs) on the functioning of the labor market.
Staff turnover and the unemployment rate are higher. Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) high-
light the inefficiency of the combination of high employment protection and the introduction
of short-term contracts. However, in their model, a majority of workers prefer this inefficient
laissez faire, an attitude that explains the system’s persistence. To reduce labor-market
duality, these authors suggest harmonizing employment protection for fixed-term contracts
with that of permanent contracts, or instituting a single labor contract.2 However, this type
of solution generates legal difficulties and might not win economic and social acceptance.
An alternative could be to offer employers financial incentives in favor of stable jobs, either
via employment duration or the type of contract (permanent contract (Contrat à Durée In-
déterminée: CDI) versus CDD or temporary work).
We examine three proposals for reaching this goal. First, Blanchard and Tirole (2003)
introducing a termination tax to finance unemployment benefits, along the lines of the U.S.
"experience rating" system. The tax aims at insourcing factoring the social costs of un-
employment into the employer’s lay-off decision. The second proposal comes from French
labor unions. To encourage employers to offer stable jobs, unemployment insurance con-
tributions should decrease gradually, depending on the worker’s tenure. This additional
contribution in the first months or years is roughly equivalent to a hiring tax spread over
several months. Both proposals will increase labor-market flow costs, which could induce
employers to lengthen average employment duration. However, the second proposal impacts
hiring flows and could have a less favorable impact on employment or well-being than the
first proposal, which targets lay-off flows. The third proposal is based on the Italian labor-
market reform. An additional contribution is levied on temporary contracts to discourage
1See in particular Bassanini and Garnero (2013).
2See, especially, the report by Cahuc and Kramarz (2004)
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short-term hirings. When an employer turns a temporary contract in permanent one, the
surtax is partly or fully refunded. Unlike the first two proposals, the penalty on short-term
contracts is linked to support for permanent hirings. We believe this approach will generate
a milder increase in labor-market rigidity than the first two proposals.
To study these policies, we use a matching model based on Pissarides (2000), where per-
manent and temporary jobs are distinct and permanent jobs are endogenously destroyed.
Due to the existence of a minimum wage (Smic) in France, real wages cannot be viewed as
perfectly flexible, in particular for temporary unskilled jobs. To allow for this, we split the
labor market into skilled and unskilled workers. We calibrate the model on French data and
simulate three public policies aiming at reducing labor-market duality: a hiring tax, a firing
tax, and a surtax on fixed-term contracts to finance a bonus for permanent hirings.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the labor-market duality in France
and introduces the three studied reforms. Then, Section 3 describes the matching model used
and Section 4 details its calibration on French data. Section 5 shows the impact of the three
stylized reforms. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The French labor-market duality
The French labor market is divided between workers in stable jobs with high employment
protection and those who accumulate unemployment spells and short-term contracts. These
two categories are compartmentalized, condemning the most precarious workers to a bumpy
occupational path. This phenomenon is characteristic of Southern European countries, par-
ticular Spain, Portugal, and–to a lesser extent–Italy and France.
The notions of duality and selection are hard to disentangle. A lack of flows between the
precarious–jobs and permanent–jobs markets may explain why workers have trouble moving
between the two. The main explanation is that the hiring flow into permanent contracts is
small because of the high employment protection they offer (See below). This phenomenon
is called duality. However, the small flows between the two markets may also be due to
a selection mechanism. Firms win the loyalty of their most productive workers by hiring
them on permanent contracts. In contrast, they refuse to establish long-term relationships
with less productive workers, who are consequently stuck in the precarious jobs market.
Empirically, the two phenomena reinforce each other. Duality degrades the employability
4
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of non-permanent workers because they are less trained and less experienced. Selection by
employers tends to keep them in the second market. In the opposite direction, selection leads
firms to offer permanent contracts to workers already employed under permanent contracts,
thus reinforcing labor-market duality.
It should be noted that duality is hard to summarize in one quantitative index. In the fol-
lowing section, duality is measured by the share of short-term contracts in total employment
and the share of short-term contracts converted into permanent contracts.
2.1 Duality is essentially due to a gap of employment protection
between CDD and CDI
In France, the share of short-term contracts in total wage-earning employment strongly
increased during the mid-1980s (Figure 1(a)) owing to the use of CDDs and, since the mid-
1990s, to the reliance on temporary workers. CDD hirings are strictly regulated by law. In
practice, however, the law is circumvented and CDDs account for almost 80% of hirings,
excluding temporary work. As Figure 1(b) shows, this proportion barely increased in the
2008-2009 crisis and is now stable. The level is higher than the mean observed level of the
2000s. However, because of their short duration, CDDs represented only 10% of wage-earning
employment in 2010 (12% including temporary workers).
To dismiss a worker in a permanent contract is often a long, risky, and costly process.
This may explain why firms use short-term contracts to increase workforce flexibility in or-
der to cope with economic risks. The growing use of CDDs and temporary work has made
the labor market more fluid, increasing job creation and destruction. However, this higher
employment flexibility, focused solely on short-term contracts, does not seem to have sig-
nificantly reduced unemployment. It has also helped to reinforce employment protection of
insiders to the detriment of outsiders’ integration. Moreover, this duality reduces human
capital, because of the reduction in training of CDD workers and in firm-specific human
capital accumulation. This has a negative impact on labor productivity.
Theoretical analysis confirms these arguments. Blanchard and Landier (2002) and Cahuc
and Postel-Vinay (2002) showed that partial flexibility, focused exclusively on short-term
contracts, reduces the CDI share and has an even stronger negative impact on flows into and
out of CDIs. Such flexibility may thus increase unemployment. The imbalance due to a gap
in dismissal costs between permanent and short-term contracts could be more harmful than
5
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Figure 1: Share of temporary contracts in wage-earning employment and hiring
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the gap in separation costs. More recently, Cahuc, Charlot, and Malherbet (2012) point
out that a strong employment protection of permanent contracts increases flows of short-
term jobs. The impact on employment is small but this employment protection significantly
reduces the labor productivity, substituting permanent jobs by short-term contracts. Inter-
national comparisons strengthen these arguments. Bassanini and Garnero (2013) show that
higher the employment protection, dualer is the labor market. The employment protection
gap between permanent and short-term contracts increases duality.3 However, this analysis
is sensitive to the robustness of the employment protection index (See Bentolila, Cahuc,
Dolado, and Le Barbanchon (2012)).
Labor-market duality has social implications. Short-term contracts are concentrated
in sensitive population categories, such as young people, women, and unskilled workers,
making their employment status precarious. In 2011, CDDs, temporary-work contracts and
3Employment protection for short-term contracts focuses on early terminations by employers and on the
conditions in which short-term hirings are allowed.
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apprenticeships represented one-half of wage-earning jobs held by young people aged 15-
24 and one-third of those held by young people aged 15-29 (21% of workers aged 15-29
have CDDs and 5% are temporary workers, compared with 7% and 2% respectively for
the 30-49s).4. The coexistence of short-term and permanent contracts leads to an unequal
distribution of risks induced by economic conditions. Risk exposure is highest for workers
under short-term contracts and the most precarious population categories. Furthermore,
the advantages of a permanent contract extend beyond the labor market, as a stable job
facilitates access to housing and loans.
2.2 Which policy can most reduce duality?
As we noted in the introduction, the most logical solution, and probably the most economi-
cally efficient, should aim to bring employment protection under short-term contracts closer
to that offered by permanent contracts. For this purpose, CDD hirings could be controlled
more strictly through tighter legislation or increased inspections. However, given the rel-
atively limited flexibility of the French labor market, firms will be less able to adjust to
demand shocks. A second option would consist, instead, in loosening restrictions on lay-offs
by offering guarantees to dismissed workers, streamlining procedures or broadening the range
of circumstances in which lay-offs are allowed. But this type of solution is politically and
socially hard to accept during a period of crisis and high unemployment. Moreover, it could
create legal problems because of the uncertainty surrounding changes in case law and com-
patibility with ILO agreements ratified by France. A third alternative would be to remove
differences between short-term and permanent contracts and create a single labor contract.5
This solution would pose the same problems as the previous options, depending on whether
the new contract offered low employment protection similar to that of short-term contracts
or high protection similar to that of permanent contracts.6
If employment-protection cannot be achieved between the two types of contract, some
second-tier solutions could be envisaged, especially financial incentives. Our article seeks to
contribute to public discussion of the issue in France by assessing three proposals.
4Source : Insee, 2011 LFS (Enquête Emploi).
5See notably the report Cahuc and Kramarz (2004).
6Lepage-Saucier, Schleich, and Wasmer (2013) show that the transition from a labor market with two
types of contract to a labor market with a unique contract is not necessarily efficient.
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Termination tax: This proposal, put forward by economists in the wake of the Blanchard
and Tirole (2003) report, is based on the experience of North American countries. In the
United States and Canada, each firm’s unemployment-insurance contribution is determined
by the benefits paid out to previously dismissed workers. This bonus-penalty system–called
"experience rating"–is designed to raise employers’ awareness of their responsibilities con-
cerning the impact of dismissals on the financial position of unemployment-insurance funds
and to make them factor this cost into their decisions. To the extent that system takes into
account all breaches of contract entitling dismissed workers to benefits (including termination
of temporary and short-term contracts, redundancies, and the mutually agreed terminations
applied in France), it offers an incentive to firms to offer stable jobs under permanent con-
tracts rather than short-term contracts. The system also encourages employers to increase
their workers’ non-specific human capital in anticipation of their possible dismissal. On the
other hand, it could discourage firms from hiring less-employable workers because of the
greater likelihood of long unemployment spells in case of contract termination. In addition,
it could incite firms to hire under very-short-term contracts, which do not make workers
eligible for unemployment benefits.
A measure similar to the previous one but simpler consists in taxing breaches and ter-
minations of labor contracts that make workers eligible for unemployment benefits. Unlike
in the experience rating system, firms pay the additional cost at the time of dismissal and
not in subsequent years, and the cost does not depend on the length of dismissed work-
ers’ unemployment spells. It therefore does not encourage firms to increase their workers’
employability, but it does not offer an incentive to hire only the more employable workers.
The two solutions may also respond differently to economic shocks. Experience rating is
less pro-cyclical (See L’Haridon and Malherbet (2010)). Nevertheless, both measures seem
to be equivalent as regards the link between employment protection and labor-market duality.
A rich literature, notably in French, details the advantages and disadvantages of such
measures. For instance, Cahuc and Zylberberg (2008) show that without a dismissal tax, the
volume of lay-offs is too high because firms do not factor in the social cost of unemployment.
However, we must take French labor-market characteristics into account, as high employment
protection reduces the expected benefits of the measure. Wage rigidity accentuates this
effect.7 Charlot and Malherbet (2010) argue that the new solution must substitute for
standard employment protection in order to limit the average unemployment spell. In the
7See Cahuc and Malherbet (2001) and Cahuc and Malherbet (2004).
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same vein, Blanchard and Tirole (2003) argue that a reduction in the non-monetary costs of
dismissals offsets the introduction of a dismissal tax.
Gradually decreasing contributions: The second category of reform proposals is mainly
advocated by trade unions.8 The key proposal is that unemployment-insurance contribu-
tions should decrease in proportion to workers’ length of service. Labor costs would thus be
higher at hiring and then decrease with time. The aim would be to encourage employers to
increase employment duration.
An alternative reform consists in raising unemployment-insurance contributions for short
term contracts. To our knowledge, there has been no economic assessment of this type of
reform. As a dismissal tax, it is likely to reduce labor-market flows and increase both average
unemployment spells and job durations. In principle, its impact on the level of unemployment
is ambiguous. We assess the proposal and compare it with a dismissal tax. By discouraging
hiring rather than job destruction, a declining-contributions system is probably less favorable
for employment than a dismissal tax.
Italian-style reform: A third proposal consists in raising unemployment-insurance con-
tributions on short-term contracts to finance a bonus for turning short-term contracts into
permanent ones. The Fornero reform in Italy, enacted in July 2012, introduces a tax on short-
term contracts (1.4% of gross wages), which is transferred to the unemployment-insurance
fund. If the short-term contract is turned into a permanent one, the tax is refunded after the
trial period. The amount is limited to the last six monthly payments. Firms are no longer
required to justify their use of short-term contracts. Controls and rules to limit substitutes
for short-term contracts have been strengthened.
To our knowledge, this Italian reform has not been evaluated. Our article aims to fill the
gap using French data. However, to obtain a reform that has no impact on public finances,
the "Italian-style" reform in our simulation uses all revenues from the tax on short-term
contracts to finance the bonus for turning short-term contracts into permanent ones. This
Italian-style reform has a positive impact on public finances as not all short-term contracts
are transformed in permanent ones and refunds are capped at six monthly payments.
8See Coquet (2010) and Coquet & Sylvain, "L’indemnisation du chômage : éléments pour une réforme",
http://www.actualite-de-la-formation.fr/IMG/pdf/DGEFP_note_indemnisation.pdf.
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The first two proposals–a dismissal tax and gradually decreasing contributions–make the
labor market less flexible because of the incentive to lengthen employment duration. To
lessen labor-market duality, it is preferable to reduce short-term contract flows and increase
permanent-contract flows rather than aggravating labor-market rigidity. As explained before,
it seems hard to simplify CDI dismissals. Incentives to permanent hirings thus seem an
economically efficient alternative.
3 Model
To study the impact of these financial incentives, we develop a matching model with endoge-
nous job destruction as described by Pissarides (2000). Several types of models allow an
examination of labor-market duality by incorporating short-term and permanent contracts.
In the first type, an exogenous proportion of hirings may consist of short-term contracts9.
The proportion depends implicitly on legislative flexibility regarding short-term contracts.
In the second type of model, firms create only short-term contracts, which are converted to
permanent ones or terminated.10 This approach takes into account the trade-off between the
two types of contracts but needs a simplification: all permanent hirings follow short-term
contracts. A third and more recent category of models endogenizes the contract choice.
Caggese and Cunat (2008) assume a higher productivity of permanent contracts. The choice
of contract is accordingly determined by a trade-off between the contract type and dismissal
costs. Cahuc, Charlot, and Malherbet (2012) introduce heterogeneity in the frequencies of
productivity shocks. The frequencies are not observed by employers when they begin their
business operations but are known when employers choose to open a vacancy. The choice
of contract (and of the duration, for a short-term contract) is made on the basis of this
frequency. The model described in this paper uses the second approach, which treats trial
periods for permanent contracts as short-term contracts.
3.1 Assumptions
We consider that the trial period becomes a permanent job when the hiring is confirmed.
Jobs are divided into those with a costly separation initiated by the employer (mostly per-
manent contracts) and those with a reduced termination cost (temporary work, short-term
contracts, trial periods, and apprenticeship). For simplicity’s sake, we shall refer to the first
9See, for instance, Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002)
10See, for instance, Goux and Maurin (2000) or Blanchard and Landier (2002).
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situation as "CDI" or "permanent contract" and the second as "CDD" or "short-term contract."
Exit flows from CDIs are not exogenous. They are determined by productivity shocks so
as to capture the effect of a dismissal tax. We model productivity as the sum of a perennial
component, which reflects the inherent quality of the job/worker match, and an economic
component, which reflects hazards on demand for the firm’s products.
Lastly, we need to take into account the effects of the minimum wage (Smic) on the lowest
wages. Cahuc and Zylberberg (1999) highlighted a strong interaction between employment
protection and minimum wage: when wages are set by bargaining, dismissal costs have no
impact on the unemployment rate because the decrease in hirings is offset by the decrease
in breaches of terminations. In particular, employment protection induces lower wages at
hiring and curbs the negative effects on hiring. When wages are not negotiated–and especially
when they are constrained by the minimum wage–the hiring wage cannot be adjusted. As
a result, the negative effect on hiring is not offset by the decrease in terminations. This
mechanism concerns earnings at minimum-wage levels but also slightly higher earnings in
order to maintain a wage hierarchy.11 As the French minimum wage (Smic) is high relative
to the median wage, we could not ignore the mechanism. Many workers are hired at the
minimum wage12 and their earnings rise with tenure.13 In order to take it into account, the
labor market is divided in two workers category. In the first part, workers are skilled and
wages are always negotiated. In the second part, workers are unskilled and are paid at the
minimum wage in short-term contracts, whereas their wage is negotiated when they are in
a permanent one.
11As demonstrated by the diffusion effects when the Smic increases (See Koubi and Lhommeau (2007)
and, more recently, by Goarant and Muller (2011) and Aeberhardt, Givord, and Marbot (2012)).
12In the 2007 LFS, low-skilled workers in full-time and short-term contracts (CDDs, apprenticeships,
temporary work, trial periods) report monthly wages averaging 1.12 times the net minimum wage for 35
hours/week. Workers under permanent contracts are paid 1.45 times the net minimum wage, and high-skilled
workers under permanent contracts earn 1.64 times the net minimum wage. Between 2003 and 2009, 26% of
workers earning the minimum wage or near the minimum wage had a tenure of less than one year, compared
with only 5% of workers paid at twice the net minimum wage or more (See Champsaur (2010) [Expert
Group Report]).
13Between 1995 and 2007, only 13% of workers present at least five years in the DADS panel maintained
their earnings at the minimum-wage level (See Ananian and Calavrezo (2010)).
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Figure 2: Model block diagram
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3.1.1 Notations
The working population is made up of unskilled and skilled workers. Skill level is subscripted
by k, with k = n for unskilled workers and k = q for skilled workers. The two categories are
normalized to 1. A proportion l0k is hired under CDDs, l1k under CDIs, and uk is unem-
ployed. Unemployment benefits are bk and the cost of a vacancy for a firm is hk (Figure 2).
We model the matching process between vacancies and unemployed persons by a matching
function. When u unemployed are seeking work and firms open v job vacancies, the number
of hirings is Mk(v,u), where Mk(., .) is an increasing function relative to both parameters,
with constant scale returns such that Mk(v,0) =Mk(0,u) = 0. Let θk = vk/uk the tightness
of each labor market. The probability of filling the post ismk(θk) withmk(θk) =Mk(1,1/θk).
The probability for an unemployed person of finding a job is θkmk(θk).
The cost for a firm of hiring a worker under a CDD is d0k, comprising administrative
costs and/or taxes. The hired workers’ productivity is z0k. The net and gross wages for
12
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the job is w0k and ρ0kw0k respectively, where ρ0k is the tax wedge. The contract ends ran-
domly, following a Poisson process of parameter λ0k. At that point, the worker reveals his or
her initial productivity zd in a CDI. Taking this productivity into account, the firm decides
whether or not to hire the worker under a CDI. zd is a random variable, distributed according
to the cumulative distribution function Fzk. Reservation productivity is noted z˜dk. Below
this threshold, the worker is not productive enough to be kept on a permanent basis CDI.
The termination costs c0k to the firm and the conversion of the contract into a CDI costs
d1k in taxes and expenses.
Once the worker is hired, some economic shocks occur following a Poisson process of
parameter λ1k. The shocks change the worker’s productivity on the job, which becomes
z = zd + ε. After each shock, the job is maintained only if z is high enough. εk(zd) is also
the threshold of ε below which the job is destroyed. In case of termination, the firm pays
c1k for the dismissal, a sum that includes taxes. In a permanent contract, the net wage is
w1k(zd, ε) for an initial productivity of zd and a possible productivity shock of ε. The tax
wedge is ρ1k. For simplicity’s sake, we regard the tax wedges ρ1k and ρ0k as independent
of the wage, in spite of the progressiveness of taxes and social contributions on labor earnings.
The productivity modelization, using an initial productivity zd and later shocks ε,14 al-
lows us to isolate a perennial component of the matching productivity and a variable one.
The perennial component is the inherent capabilities of the worker and its compatibility with
the job. The variable component reflects the risks on the firm’s demand. An alternative mod-
elization, simpler, should be that, for each shock, the productivity is randomly determined
following a random process, identical to the process for the initial productivity. In this case,
CDI durations follow a Poisson process with a constant termination probability. This does
not fit empirical observation as the probability of a CDI exit is decreasing with tenure – the
average tenure is higher than the average job duration. This observation is consistent with
a selection effect as the jobs with a low perennial component of the productivity are fastly
terminated. Then, only jobs with a high productivity last and their duration is higher than
the one of other jobs.
3.1.2 Bellman equations
Decisions to create jobs, hire under permanent contracts or terminate permanent or short-
term contracts are based on the flow values of the various options. To the firm, the flow
14Introduced in Cahuc and Zylberberg (1999).
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value of a vacant job is noted Πvk, Π0k for a short-term job and Π1k (zd, ε) for a permanent
one. Initial productivity is zd and a potential shock is ε. Symmetrically, the worker’s flow
values are noted Vuk if she is unemployed, V0k under a CDD and V1k (zd, ε) under CDI.
The firm’s flow values correspond to the Bellman equations (1) to (3), where r is the
interest rate. Equation (1) expresses the flow value of a firm that opens a vacancy consisting
of a per-period fixed cost to keep a vacant job open, hk, and the returns on a short-term
contract Π0k−Πvk minus the hiring costs d0k with the probability mk(θk) in each period.
rΠvk = −hk +mk(θk) [Π0k−Πvk−d0k] (1)
rΠ0k = z0k−ρ0kw0k +λ0kFzk(z˜dk)[Πvk−Π0k− c0k]
+λ0k
∫ ∞
z˜dk
[Π1k(zd,0)−Π0k−d1k]dFzk(zd) (2)
rΠ1k (zd, ε) = zd+ ε−ρ1kw1k(zd, ε) +λ1kFεk (εk(zd)) [Πvk−Π1k (zd, ε)− c1k]
+λ1k
∫ ∞
εk(zd)
[
Π1k(zd, ε′)−Π1k (zd, ε)
]
dFεk(ε′), ∀(zd, ε) (3)
For a CDD (Equation (2)) the flow value is the worker’s productivity z0k minus the pay
roll cost ρ0kw0k, minus the returns in case of contract termination, [Πvk−Π0k− c0k], with
the probability λ0kFzk(z˜dk) for each period. We add the return on a conversion to a CDI
contract with the probability λ0k(1−Fzk(z˜dk)). If CDI hiring has an initial productivity of
zd, the CDI value is Π1k(zd,0)−Π0k−d1k.
When the job is turned into a CDI with an initial productivity zd and a potential shock
ε (Equation (3)) the firm earns zd+ ε minus the payroll cost ρ1kw1k(zd, ε). The probability
of contract termination is λ1kFεk (εk(zd)), in which case the firm loses Πvk−Π1k (zd, ε)−c1k.
The probability that the shock will not lead to CDI termination is λ1k(1−Fεk (εk(zd))). If
the shock is ε′, the value for the firm is Π1k(zd, ε′)−Π1k (zd, ε).
The flow values for an unemployed person or a CDD or CDI worker are determined in
the same way and are given by the Bellman Equations (4) à (6).
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rVuk = bk + θkmk(θk)[V0k−Vuk] (4)
rV0k = w0k +λ0kFzk(z˜dk)[Vuk−V0k] +λ0k
∫ ∞
z˜dk
[V1k(zd,0)−V0k]dFzk(zd) (5)
rV1k (zd, ε) = w1k(zd, ε) +λ1kFεk (εk(zd)) [Vuk−V1k (zd, ε)]
+λ1k
∫ ∞
εk(zd)
[
V1k(zd, ε′)−V1k (zd, ε)
]
dFεk(ε′), ∀(zd, ε) (6)
In what follows, we consider that firms can freely enter or exit the market, verifying the
free-entry condition Πvk = 0.
3.1.3 Wage negotiation
As noted earlier, unskilled workers’ wages are exogenous and set by the minimum wage. By
contrast, wages for permanent jobs and skilled CDD workers are negotiated using a gener-
alized Nash criterion.
Wages of negotiated short-term jobs are set at hiring and cannot be renegotiated before
the end of the contract. For skilled workers, the firm’s surplus during the negotiation is
Sf0q = (Π0q − d0q)−Πvq and the worker’s surplus is Se0q = V0q −Vuq. With γ0q the skilled
CDD workers’ negotiation power, the negotiation program is the following:
max
w0q
[
Se0q
]γ0q [
Sf0q
]1−γ0q
Regarding Equations (2) and (5) –or, more directly, Equations (30) and (33) in Appendix
A.1–, Sf0q and Se0q are linear functions of w0q with the slopes −ρ0q/(r+λ0q) and 1/(r+λ0q),
respectively. The solution of the maximization program is the following:
γ0qS
f
0q = (1−γ0q)ρ0qSe0q (7)
In contrast, the CDI wage–whatever the skill level–can be renegotiated at any time
after hiring, including at the signing contract. This is therefore anticipated during the
hiring process, and the hiring wage is negotiated as the contract were already in force.
Accordingly, regardless of when the negotiation takes place, the firm negotiates depending on
its surplus Sf1k(zd, ε) = Π1k (zd, ε)− (Πvk−c1k). The worker’s surplus is given by Se1k(zd, ε) =
V1k (zd, ε)−Vuk. The CDI worker’s negotiation power is noted γ1k. The negotiated wage is
also determined by the following maximization program:
15
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.61
∀(zd, ε), max
w1k(zd,ε)
[Se1k(zd, ε)]
γ1k
[
Sf1k(zd, ε)
]1−γ1k
According to the Bellman Equations (3) and (6) (or (31) and (34) in Appendix A.1),
Sf1k(zd, ε) and Se1k(zd, ε) are linear functions of w1k. Their slope ratio is ρ1k. The solution of
the program is thus:
∀(zd, ε), γ1kSf1k(zd, ε) = (1−γ1k)ρ1kSe1k(zd, ε) (8)
Using the Bellman equations, we show that the wage is determined by w1k(zd, ε) =
(1− γ1k)rVuk + γ1kρ1k (zd + ε+ rc1k) (See Appendix A.2). The CDI wage increases with the
productivity current value zd + , the termination costs, and the flow value of unemploy-
ment, which is the worker’s downturn point in the wage negotiation. In what follows, we
write St0k = S
f
0k +ρ0kSe0k and St1k(zd, ε) = S
f
1k(zd, ε) +ρ1kSe1k(zd, ε).15
3.2 Model equilibrium
3.2.1 Reservation productivities
CDI maintained: When a shock occurs, with a new productivity zd+ ε, the contract is
maintained if Sf1k(zd, ε) ≥ 0 and Se1k(zd, ε) ≥ 0. Equation (8) shows that these conditions
obtain if and only if St1k(zd, ε) ≥ 0. The productivity shock threshold εk(zd), above which
the firm does not dismiss the worker, is also defined by:
∀ zd, St1k(zd, εk(zd)) = 0 (9)
Equation (9) gives the job destruction (Equation (10)), implicitly yielding the value of
εk(zd) (See Appendix A.3 for calculations).
∀ zd, 0 = εk(zd) + zd− r(ρ1kVuk− c1k) +
λ1k
r+λ1k
∫ ∞
εk(zd)
(ε′− εk(zd))dFεk(ε′) (10)
εk(zd) is a decreasing function of zd. The higher the initial productivity, the fewer are the
shocks ε leading to dismissal. For a given zd, εk(zd) reduces with c1k and increases with Vuk.
In other words, a high dismissal cost decreases the probability of a contract termination. By
contrast, a higher reservation wage increases the probability.
15Strictly speaking, these do not represent the collective surpluses, which are slightly more complex:
Sc0k = Se0k+S
f
0k and Sc1k(zd,ε) = S
f
1k(zd,ε)+Se1k(zd,ε). The wage-negotiation results (7) and (8) show that,
when wages are negotiated, both expressions are proportional and have the same sign. More precisely,
Sc0q = (1−γ0q +γ0q/ρ0q)St0q et Sc1k(zd,ε) = (1−γ1k+γ1k/ρ1k)St1k(zd,ε).
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CDI hiring: At the end of a CDD, the employer decides to turn the contract into a
permanent one if and only if zd ≥ z˜dk, i.e., if and only if the hiring flow value is sufficiently
high compared with the dismissal flow value. The first value is Π1k(zd,0)−Π0k− d1k and
the second Πvk−Π0k−c0k. Accordingly, the CDI hiring will occur if and only if Sf1k(zd,0)≥
d1k+c1k−c0k. The productivity threshold z˜d, above which the worker is hired permanently,
is given by:
Sf1k(z˜dk,0) = d1k + c1k− c0k (11)
Using the results of wage bargaining (8), Equation (11) is rewritten:
St1k(z˜dk,0) =
1
1−γ1k [d1k + c1k− c0k] (12)
Suppose that the CDI dismissal costs are high enough such that d1k+c1k−c0k is strictly
positive. Then, St1k(z˜dk,0) is also strictly positive. For the initial productivities zd lower than
z˜dk but sufficiently high to obtain St1k(zd,0) > 0, the worker and the firm can find a wage
such that the both win to a CDI hiring. However, when the contract is signed, the worker
could upwards renegotiate her wage, using the threat of the dismissal costs. Anticipating
this "holdup", the employer prefers terminating the contract.
The CDI hiring equation is given by the following Equation (13), in which εk(z˜dk) is set
by Equation (14). Equation (13) comes directly from Equation (10) whereas Equation (14)
is deduced from Equation (12) (See Appendix A.3).
0 = εk(z˜dk) + z˜dk− r(ρ1kVuk− c1k) +
λ1k
r+λ1k
∫ ∞
εk(z˜dk)
(ε− εk(z˜dk))dFεk(ε) (13)
εk(z˜dk) = −
r+λ1k
1−γ1k [d1k + c1k− c0k] (14)
Using the CDI hiring equation, we obtain the reservation productivity z˜dk required for a
CDI, depending on Vuk and the exogenous parameters of the model. z˜dk is thus a growing
and linear function of the unemployment flow value. If this value is high, the worker can ne-
gotiate a higher wage, so that the CDI hiring will occur only for high initial productivities zd.
For a given Vuk the reservation productivity z˜dk increases with d1k and c1k and decreases
with c0k. CDI hiring and dismissal costs discourage hirings. By contrast, CDD dismissal costs
are an incentive to maintain the job by offering the worker a CDI. Moreover, the threshold
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z˜dk increases with ρ1k, as a high tax wedge reduces the collective surplus to maintain the
job. ρ0k and d0k does not impact the CDI hiring equation.
3.2.2 Skilled-workers equilibrium
Labor demand: The labor-demand equation is given by Equation (15), where Λq is set
by Equation (16), εq(zd) by Equation (10) and z˜dq by the CDI hiring equations (13-14) (See
Appendix A.4 for calculation).
mq(θq) =
hq(r+λ0q)
(1−γ0q)Λq (15)
with:
Λq = z0q−λ0q
[
Fzq(z˜dq)c0q +
(
1−Fzq(z˜dq)
)
(d1q + c1q)
]
− (r+λ0q)d0q− rρ0qVuq
− λ0q
r+λ1q
[
1−γ1q +γ1q ρ0q
ρ1q
]∫ ∞
z˜dq
εq(zd)dFzq(zd) (16)
The unemployment flow value Vuq of skilled workers decreases demand for this type of
workers. The tightness of this labor market θq is a decreasing function of Vuq. Tightness
also decreases with the cost of a vacant job hq and the workers’ bargaining power in CDD
and CDI16 (γ0q and γ1q, respectively). It increases with the CDD productivity z0q.
Concerning the tax and social-contribution parameters, levies d0q, d1q, c1q and ρ1q in-
crease labor costs and so reduce labor demand. For a given Vuq, they decrease labor-market
tightness θq. The impact of CDD termination costs c0q is ambiguous, as it partially reduces
the "holdup" phenomenon, which, in turn, increases tightness. The tax wedge effect ρ0d also
has an indeterminate impact on θq as it reduces the collective surplus but increases the share
of the firm’s surplus in the wage negotiation (See Table 1).
Labor supply: The labor supply equation is given by Equation 17 (See Appendix A.4 for
calculation). The unemployment flow value Vuq is an increasing function depending on the
tightness θq, as the unemployed expect to find work more easily if tightness is greater.
θqmq(θq) =
(rVuq− bq)(r+λ0q)ρ0q
γ0qΛq
(17)
Moreover, the unemployment flow value increases with unemployment benefits bq and
the CDD worker’s negotiation power, γ0q. By contrast, it decreases with the CDI worker’s
16This last point needs the hypothesis, which is verified in practice, ρ0q < ρ1q.
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Table 1: Impact of tax and social-contribution parameters for skilled workers
(negotiated wages under CDDs)
Labor-demand Labor-supply Impact on:
curve curve θq Vuq z˜dq
d0q ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ * ↓
d1q ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ * ?
c0q ? ? ? ? ↓
c1q ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ * ?
ρ0q ? ↑ ? ↓č ↓č
ρ1q ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ * ?
Note: Demonstration of the results are given in Appendix A.4. Some results, marked *, can be
directly deduced from the shifts in labor supply and demand curves. Moreover, the results indicated
by ** require an assumption about the value of ηq, verified in practice.
Interpretation: The labor-demand curve, plotted in the plane (Vuq,θq), shifts toward the low values
of θq when d0q increases, whereas the labor-supply curve shifts toward the high values of θq. At
equilibrium, an increase of d0q reduces θq. The impact of c0q on the labor supply and demand
curves is ambiguous.
negotiation power, γ1q.17
Because of the CDD wage negotiation, the impact of the tax and social-contribution
parameters is symmetrical to those of the labor-demand equation. For a given labor-market
tightness θq, d0q, d1q, c1q and ρ1q reduce Vuq. ρ0q also reduces Vuq as the tax wedge diminishes
the collective surplus of a CDD matching and decreases the worker’s share of this surplus
(See Appendix A.4 for the demonstration). c0q has also an ambiguous effect by reducing the
"holdup" phenomenon.
Equilibrium: Equilibrium is deduced from labor demand and supply curves (See Fig-
ure 3). The cost of a vacancy hq reduces labor-market tightness and the unemployment flow
value. Unemployment benefits, bq, and the CDD worker’s negotiation power in CDD, γ0q,
also decrease the tightness. However, bq positively impacts the unemployment flow value,
whereas γ0q has an ambiguous effect–positive on wages, negative on job access.
The impact of d0q, d1q, c1q and ρ1q on Vuq is directly deduced from the shifts in labor
supply and demand curves. All four parameters reduce the unemployment flow value. They
17Under the hypothesis, verified in practice, ρ0q < ρ1q.
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Figure 3: Labor market equilibrium for skilled and unskilled workers
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decrease the tightness of the labor market using the labor demand but increase it concerning
the labor supply. However, the calculation shows that the first mechanism is stronger and,
consequently, the four parameters decrease in fine the labor market tightness. The impact
of c0q and ρ0q on Vuq and θq are ambiguous for the same previous reasons. But we can show
that ρ0q reduces Vuq (See Appendix A.4).
z˜dk variations are also valuable, notably for assessing the impact of duality, because they
show how tax and social-contribution parameters modify the probability of being hired under
a permanent contract after a CDD. Accordingly, an increase in d0q, c0q and ρ0q decreases z˜dq
and so increases the likelihood of being hired under a CDI. Our intuitions are the following:
d0q increases the initial hiring cost, what encourages employers to extend short-term con-
tracts by CDI. c0q directly encourages CDI hiring rather than CDD termination; ρ0q reduces
the CDI cost relative to the CDD cost. d1q, c1q and ρ1q have an ambiguous impact on these
hiring probabilities, as they directly reduce the benefits of CDI but reduce the unemployment
flow value Vuq. This tempers wage claims in CDI, increasing the CDI hiring probability.
3.2.3 Unskilled-workers equilibrium
Labor demand: As CDD wages are not negotiated, labor supply and demand differ from
those of the skilled workers (Equation (18): see Appendix A.5 for calculation).
mn(θn) =
hn(r+λ0n)
Λ(d)n
(18)
with:
Λ(d)n = z0n−ρ0nw0n−λ0n [Fzn(z˜dn)c0n+ (1−Fzn(z˜dn))(d1n+ c1n)]− (r+λ0n)d0n
−λ0n(1−γ1n)
r+λ1n
∫ ∞
z˜dn
εn(zd)dFzn(zd) (19)
Labor demand is still a decreasing function of the unemployment flow value. It falls with
the cost of a vacancy, w0n, and the CDI worker’s bargaining power, γ1n. By contrast, it rises
with CDD productivity, z0n.
As they increase the labor cost, d0n, d1n, c1n, ρ0n and ρ1n reduce labor demand. However,
the impact of the termination cost c0n is ambiguous. As with skilled workers, the termination
cost raises the hiring cost but also moderates the "holdup" phenomenon (Table 2).
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Table 2: Impact of tax and social-contribution parameters for unskilled workers
(CDD paid at minimum wage rate)
Labor-demand Labor-supply Impact on:
curve curve θn Vun z˜dn
d0n ↓ 0 ↓ * ↓ * ↓
d1n ↓ ↑ ? ↓ * ↑
c0n ? ↓ ↓ ? ↓
c1n ↓ ? ? ? ↑
ρ0n ↓ 0 ↓ * ↓ * ↓
ρ1n ↓ ↑ ? ↓ * ?
Note: The demonstration of results is given in Appendix A.4. Some results, marked *, can be
directly deduced from the shift in labor supply and demand curves.
Interpretation: The labor demand curve, plotted in the plane (Vun,θn), shifts to the low values of
θq when d0n rises, whereas the labor-supply curve does not change. At equilibrium, an increase of
d0n reduces θn. The impact of c0n on the labor-supply curve is ambiguous.
Labor supply: Equation (20) is the labor-market supply (See Appendix A.5). The unem-
ployment flow value increases with the labor-market tightness, θn, unemployment benefits,
bq, the minimum wage, w0n, and the CDI worker’s bargaining power, γ1n.
θnmn(θn) =
(rVun− bn)(r+λ0n)
Λ(o)n
(20)
with:
Λ(o)n = w0n− rVun−
λ0nγ1n
ρ1n(r+λ1n)
∫ ∞
z˜dn
εn(zd)dFzn(zd) (21)
For a tightness θn, c0n increases the probability of being hired under a permanent con-
tract and consequently the unemployment flow value, Vun. By contrast, d1n decreases the
probability of obtaining a CDI, reducing Vun. The impact of c1n is undetermined because
it decreases the probability of a CDI hiring but increases employment duration and the ne-
gotiated wage. The tax wedge for CDDs, ρ0n, and the hiring cost, d0n, have no impact on
the labor-supply equation, as the wage is not negotiated in CDD. Consequently, the costs
are entirely supported by the firm. ρ1n decreases Vun because it reduces the probability of
being hired under a CDI, as the wage is negotiated.
Equilibrium: As with skilled workers, equilibrium is obtained from by the labor supply
and demand equations. Labor-market tightness decreases with the cost of a vacancy, hn, un-
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employment benefits, bn, the minimum wage, w0n, and the CDI worker’s bargaining power,
γ1n. By contrast, it rises with CDD productivity z0n. The unemployment flow value, Vun,
decreases with hn and increases with bn and z0n. The impact of the minimum wage, w0n,
and the CDI worker’s bargaining power, γ1n, on Vun are undetermined. They increase wages
for CDDs and CDIs respectively, but reduce hirings.
Table 2 summarizes the impact of tax and social-contribution variables on equilibrium.
Higher taxes and contributions have a negative or ambiguous impact on Vun, θn and z˜dn.
3.2.4 Unemployment
The Beveridge curve, shown in Equation (22) (See Appendix A.5 for calculation), gives the
unemployment rate. The latter decreases with labor-market tightness. It increases with the
probability of a productivity shock during a CDI, λ1k, the probability of CDD termination,
λ0k, and the probability of being unemployed at the end of a CDD, Fzk(z˜dk).
uk =
1
1 + θkmk(θk)
[
1
λ0k
+ 1λ1k
∫∞
z˜dk
dFzk(zd)
Fεk(εk(zd))
] (22)
3.3 Labor market participation and the total economy
The working populations, Nk, are determined by the individual trade-off between labor and
leisure (Cahuc and Carcillo (2007)). Inactivity income and leisure preferences are random
variables (See Appendix A.7). As the utility of entering the market rises with the unemploy-
ment flow value, the probability of labor-market participation, Ψk, grows with Vuk.
We examine the two labor markets in parallel in a broader framework aiming at repro-
ducing the whole economy. We consider a closed economy with capital and labor as inputs.
The different types of labor–CDD or CDI, skilled or unskilled–are perfectly substitutable
but differ by their productivity, z. In the long-term equilibrium, the value added is thus
given, to within a constant factor, by ∑k∈{q,n}Nk[l0kz0k + l1kz1k] where the z1k values are
the average CDI productivity values for each skills level (See Appendix A.8 for calculation).
General government is funded by payroll taxes, capital taxes, and taxes generated by la-
bor market flows. General government has fixed expenditures and distributes unemployment
benefits.
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4 Calibration on French data
We calibrate the model using French data between 2003-2011 using an annual time unit.
The self-employed workers are not taken into account. Some parameters are directly es-
timated while others are calibrated in order to make the model reflect some labor-market
characteristics.
Labor-market flows: We estimate labor-market flows using the Labor Force Survey (LFS:
in France, Enquête Emploi) with a quarterly panel. The measured transition probabilities
(Table 5 in Appendix B.1) indicate λ0k values of 1.52 for skilled workers and 1.64 for un-
skilled workers–for an average CDD duration of 8 and 7 months respectively. Fzk(z˜dk) values
are 40.8% for skilled workers and 57.1% for unskilled workers. At the end of a CDD, a skilled
worker has 6 chances in 10 of staying on under a CDI; an unskilled worker, 4 chances in 10.
The CDI average duration is 10 years for skilled workers and 7 years for unskilled workers.
Unemployment durations are 5 and 6 months respectively. These values, lower than those
actually observed, reflect the model’s choice of a systematic unemployment transition be-
tween jobs (See Appendix B.1).
Using the LFS to compare CDI termination rates and average CDI tenure, we can assess
the extent and regularity of productivity shocks on the labor market. If the shocks were
large but infrequent, employers would dismiss their workers at almost every shock. As a
result, mean tenure would be close to the average CDI duration. If, instead, the shocks were
frequent but small, we would also observe substantial selection. Workers with high initial
productivity, zdk, would remain employed for a long period. Consequently, the average
tenure of the stock of workers, which comprises highly productive workers, would exceed
the average CDI duration as the low-productive workers do not keep their jobs for long. In
practice, the average CDI tenure for skilled and unskilled workers as measured in the LFS
is 2.7 and 3.4 longer respectively than the average CDI duration.
Wages: The LFS measures the ratio of average net wages between CDIs and CDDs. The
average net wage for CDIs is 1.67 times that of CDDs for skilled workers, versus 1.28 for
unskilled workers. On average, skilled workers earn 1.78 times more than unskilled workers.
Tax wedges: The tax wedge is the gap between the wage paid by the employer and the
wage actually received by the worker. It captures the difference between purchasing power
and labor costs, comprising social contributions, income tax, and VAT. For simplicity’s sake,
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we do not take into account the labor costs that are not included in workers’ compensation.
We posit a homogeneous income tax rate of 10% (See, for instance, Laffargue (1996)). Sup-
posing that 59% of the VAT is paid by households (See Conseil des impôts, 2001), national
accounting data for 2010 put the average VAT rate on household consumption at 7.9%. The
average employer’s social contribution rate is 35.8%, calculated as the ratio of net wages to
gross wages. This average is differentiated by skill because of the contribution exemption
for low wages. Taking the mean payrolls and relative wages in the LFS, and factoring in the
contribution exemption, we find employer’s social contributions rates of 13.8% for unskilled
CDD workers, 32.5% for unskilled CDI workers, 35.2% for skilled CDD workers, and 41.0%
for skilled CDI workers. Private-sector employees contribute 21.5% of their gross wages. The
total tax wedge is 1.74 and 2.02 for unskilled workers under CDDs and CDIs respectively,
and 2.06 and 2.15 for skilled workers under CDDs and CDIs respectively.
Unemployment benefits: On the basis of wage levels for skilled and unskilled workers,
unemployment benefits represent 67.2% of the average of the most recent wages for skilled
workers and 72% for unskilled workers because of the contribution exemption for the latter.
Hiring and termination costs: Kramarz and Michaud (2009) show that CDD hiring
costs are not significant, so that d0k = 0. CDD termination costs c0k are zero because the
short-term contract allowance can be regarding as deferred compensation. Kramarz and
Michaud (2009), also conclude that CDI hiring costs are equal to 3% of annual compensa-
tion and are linear with respect to wages. Consequently, we set d1k at 3% of average wages
at the start of a CDI, irrespective of the worker’s skill level.
Dismissal costs are harder to calibrate. Abowd and Kramarz (2003) find high dismissal
costs, with a large fixed cost. These results are confirmed by Kramarz and Michaud (2009).
Fixed costs are particularly high for collective dismissals. On average, at the median wage
level, dismissal costs are equivalent to 8 months’ wages. However, the costs include severance
pay, which should be treated as deferred wages in a wage-negotiation situation (Lazear
(1990)). Subtracting severance pay, we assume that dismissal costs are equal to 5 months’
mean wages at the end of a CDI (Cheron (2009)).
Bargaining power: Like Abowd and Allain (1996), we set CDI workers’ bargaining power
at 0.4.18 We calibrate skilled CDD workers’ bargaining power so that the ratio between their
18Cahuc, Gianella, Goux, and Zylberberg (2002) find 0.2%.
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CDD and CDI wages is consistent with observations. Note that the bargaining power of 0.19
is lower than for CDI workers and that such a negotiation power would lead to a lower CDD
wage for unskilled workers if CDD wages were negotiated.
Matching functions: The matching functions are Cobb-Douglas functions–Mk(v,u) =
M0kv
1−ηkuηk with u and v the number of unemployed and vacancies, respectively. The
mk functions are written mk(θ) = M0kθ−ηk . There is no consensus on the unemployment
elasticity of the matching function. To our knowledge, the only estimate on French data is
the one by Maillard (1997). However, the data are sensitive and the results of 0.6 or 0.7–
depending on the specification–are higher than the figures for other countries. That is why
we use 0.3 for each labor market, consistent with the recent results by Borowczyk-Martins,
Jolivet, and Postel-Vinay (2012) on U.S. data, which correct endogeneity bias. In particular,
if firms know that they will have trouble hiring, they may not advertise vacancies. We
calibrate M0k coefficients.
Productivity: The stochastic processes zd and ε–defined by the cumulative distribution
functions Fzk and Fεk–follow a uniform law between zmindk and zmaxdk for zd and between εmink
and 0 for ε, with εmink < 0. By setting 0 as the maximum for ε, we aim to simplify the
model, for we assume that the most recently created jobs are those best suited to a changing
economic environment.
For unskilled workers, we normalize maximal productivity zmaxdn to 1. The other bounds–
zmaxdq , zmindn , zmindq , εminq and εminn –are calibrated. This calibration notably ensure that the
average productivity ratio between unskilled ans skilled workers is equal to the ratio of
average labor compensation, i.e., that (zq)/(zn) equal to (ρw)q/(ρw)n.
Labor supply: The labor-market participation rate is given by Ψk(Vuk) = Ψ0k V µkuk .19
Labor market elasticity µk is set at 0.2 for both skilled and unskilled workers (Cahuc and Car-
cillo (2007) and Chetty (2012)). The Ψ0k values are set to obtain the observed participation
rate.
Interest rate: The interest rate r is 4% (Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)).
Calibrated parameters: For each labor market, two degrees of freedom remain. We ar-
bitrarily choose to set hk at the level of zmaxdk and z0k at 30% of the segment [zmindk , zmaxdk ].
19Formally, this means that the law of U−1 (U(ζ/r) + ξ) follows the cumulative distribution function
Ψk(x) = Ψ0kxµk on the support [1,Ψ−1/µk0k ] (See Appendix A.7).
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The model parameters for both labor markets are summarized in Table 6 of Appendix C.
The corresponding equilibrium is described in Tables 7 and 8 of the same appendix.
Ultimately, a 1% increase in the tax wedge raises the unemployment rate by 0.34 percent-
age points. In the (WS-PS) model, where the curve (PS) is horizontal in the long term and
the tax-wedge elasticity of real labor costs in the (WS) curve is assumed to equal unity, such
a sensitivity of the unemployment rate to the tax wedge corresponds to a quasi-elasticity of
3 of the negotiated wage to the unemployment rate in the (WS) curve. Empirical estimates
based on French data for this parameter show an impact between 2 (L’Horty and Sobczak
(1997)) and 6 (Cotis, Méary, and N. (1998) and Bonnet and Mahfouz (1996)). Moreover, a
1% increase in the minimum wage (Smic) destroys 0.21% of employment. Such a variation
seems to be reasonable given the distribution of low wages, the estimates of the labor-cost
elasticity of jobs used in the literature, and the available measures of the Smic’s diffusion
effect (Aeberhardt, Givord, and Marbot (2012)).
5 Three stylized public policies
We simulate the three reforms introduced in Section 2.2 using the model calibrated on French
data. Some results–particularly the ones for job and unemployment stocks–are sensitive to
the calibration. The effects on unemployment should be interpreted with caution. However,
all results concerning labor market flows are robust to the parameter choices. The simulation
results are summarized in Table 3.
5.1 "Gradually decreasing contributions" reform
We model the introduction of an additional contribution of 2 percentage points of gross
wages20 during the first year of employment, representing (ex ante) 0.1% of GDP. The ad-
ditional contribution is equivalent to a hiring tax such as d0k equal to 1.7% of annual gross
wages.21 This entails a cost for the employer of e306 and e447 for hiring unskilled and
skilled workers respectively. The additional contribution is offset by a uniform decrease in
labor contributions (ρ0k and ρ1k), corresponding to 0.26 percentage points of gross wages.
Thanks to this decrease, the reform is neutral ex ante on the public finances, i.e., before
20Gross wages equal net wages plus VAT, income tax, and employees’ social contributions. Total labor
costs consist of gross wages plus employers’ social contributions.
21The gap with the additional-contribution rate reflects the fact that life expectancy in the job during the
first year is necessarily lower than 1 year.
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taking into account agents’ behavioral changes due to the reform.
By imposing a financial penalty on CDD hirings, the reform reduces labor-market flexi-
bility, lengthening average unemployment and CDI durations by 0.13 months and 0.21 years
respectively. As hirings are more expensive, employers have an incentive to decrease em-
ployee turnover and so to keep workers in their jobs. The reform also increases the share of
CDI hirings at the end of CDDs. The employment rate rises for CDIs and falls for CDDs.
This phenomenon is more pronounced for unskilled workers than for skilled workers. As the
first are paid at the minimum wage level, the entire tax is supported by the firm. For skilled
workers, wages are negotiated, so that the tax burden is shared between the worker and the
employer.
As entry and exit flows are smaller, the matching is less efficient and CDI labor pro-
ductivity decreases (by 0.51%). The impact on total productivity is a less negative -0.33%
owing to the increase in the number of CDIs compared with CDDs. In all, value added
decreases by 0.28%. Wages fall because of lower labor productivity and in spite of the tax
wedge reduction. Excluding the 0.86% decline in wages of skilled CDD workers–due to the
fact that the hiring tax is factored into the wage negotiation–most of the wage decrease is
concentrated among unskilled CDI workers. By contrast, wages of skilled CDI workers do
not change. The loss of productivity is sufficiently modest to be offset by the decrease in the
tax and social-contribution parameters.
5.2 "Termination tax" reform
In this section, we model the introduction of a tax on labor-contract terminations, set at
16% of the worker’s last gross monthly wage. We summarize the reform by an increase in
the separation cost for all types of contract except CDDs converted to CDIs. In the model,
therefore, we apply comparable increases to c0k and c1k, equivalent to 0.1 points of GDP. For
the employer, the tax represents e245 at the end of a CDD not converted to a CDI and e340
at the end of a CDI for an unskilled worker (for a skilled worker, the tax comes to e356 and
e597 respectively). As previously, the introduction of a termination cost is offset by a de-
crease in the tax wedge equal to 0.26% of the gross wage, in order to preserve fiscal neutrality.
The effects of this reform are relatively similar to those of the previous one, for em-
ployers anticipate the termination tax during the hiring negotiation. Thus, by encouraging
employers to maintain the jobs, the reform increases the average CDI duration. Here, the
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incentive is direct–in contrast to the hiring tax, for which the incentive was the expectation
of a higher replacement cost. Consistently with intuition, the impact on average duration
is stronger then with the previous reform. We estimate it at 0.25 additional years versus
0.21. The reform also discourages hiring because of the expectation of a higher termination
cost. Unemployment duration increases less than under the previous reform, by 0.11 months
versus 0.13. This finding, as well, is consistent with intuition, since the incentive is less direct
than the previous one. The employment rate rises 0.45 points for CDIs and falls 0.37 points
for CDDs.
As CDI duration increases more than with the previous reform, the impact on produc-
tivity is more negative at -0.37% against -0.33%. The impact on value added is close to that
of the previous reform, at -0.29% versus -0.28%.
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Table 3: Reforms neutral ex ante on the public finance
decreasing
contrib.
termination
tax
Italian style
U
ns
ki
lle
d
w
or
ke
rs
Vun -0.007 -0.004 +0.005
Fzn(z˜dn) (in %) -0.32 -0.14 -1.13
Average unemployment duration (in month) +0.19 +0.16 +0.08
Average CDI duration (in year) +0.25 +0.27 -0.15
un (in % of working population) -0.03 -0.09 +0.11
l0n (ditto) -0.53 -0.51 -0.07
l1n (ditto) +0.55 +0.59 -0.04
CDD hirings (ditto) -0.86 -0.83 -0.12
CDI hirings (ditto) -0.29 -0.32 +0.23
Productivity (in %) -0.53 -0.56 +0.14
Sk
ill
ed
w
or
ke
rs
Vuq +0.004 +0.004 +0.011
Fzq(z˜dq) (in %) -0.30 -0.06 -1.19
Average unemployment duration (in month) +0.00 +0.00 -0.07
Average CDI duration (in year) +0.12 +0.17 -0.16
uq (in % of working population) -0.08 -0.09 -0.10
l0q (ditto) -0.14 -0.15 -0.02
l1q (ditto) +0.22 +0.24 +0.12
CDD hirings (ditto) -0.21 -0.23 -0.03
CDI hirings (ditto) -0.08 -0.13 +0.16
Productivity (in %) -0.20 -0.24 +0.07
E
co
no
m
y
Average unemployment duration (in month) +0.13 +0.11 +0.04
Average CDI duration (in year) +0.21 +0.25 -0.15
Unemployment rate (in % of working population) -0.05 -0.09 +0.03
CDD employment rate (ditto) -0.37 -0.37 -0.05
CDI employment rate (ditto) +0.41 +0.45 +0.04
CDD hirings (ditto) -0.61 -0.59 -0.08
CDI hirings (ditto) -0.21 -0.25 +0.20
Average CDD net wage (in %) -0.15 -0.16 -0.33
Average CDI net wage (in %) -0.20 -0.19 +0.12
Employment (in thousands) +11 +22 -3
Pay roll (in %) +0.02 +0.07 +0.09
CDI productivity (in %) -0.51 -0.55 +0.14
Productivity (in %) -0.33 -0.37 +0.14
Value added (in %) -0.28 -0.29 +0.13
Public administrations balance (in % of GDP) +0.02 +0.04 +0.03
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For skilled and unskilled workers alike, a termination tax is more favorable than gradu-
ally decreasing contributions in terms of unemployment flow values, which we can regard as
equivalent to the well-being of new entrants. We find comparable results for average unem-
ployment duration. However, gradually decreasing contributions have a more positive effect
on the CDD-to-CDI conversion rate. The unemployment rate is relatively similar.
5.3 "Italian-style" reform
This third reform introduces an additional contribution on CDDs of 2.7% of the gross wage,
equivalent to 0.1 points of GDP. To offset the tax and so ensure the reform’s ex ante fiscal
neutrality, CDI hirings at the end of CDDs are subsidized at the rate of 26% of the gross
monthly wage on hiring. The subsidy amounts to e581 for unskilled workers and e997 for
skilled workers.
The effects are very different from those of the first two reforms. There are more CDD-
to-CDI conversions. The increase in the unemployment flow value is more significant, at
0.005 points or e272 for unskilled workers compared with a negative 0.004 points or -e359
for the gradually decreasing contributions. For skilled workers, the increase comes to 0.11
points versus 0.004 points with gradually decreasing contributions.
Contrary to the first two reforms, employers are incited to hire under CDIs and the la-
bor market is less rigid. CDI entries rise by 0.2 points of the working population per year,
compared with a 0.2-point decline with gradually decreasing contributions. CDD entries
are slightly fewer, down 0.08 points. This reflects the ambiguous effect of higher CDI en-
try and exit rates and a larger tax wedge for CDDs. However, the decline in CDD entries
is clearly smaller than with gradually decreasing contributions, which entail a 0.61-point loss.
This greater flexibility reflects the average unemployment and CDI durations. Average
unemployment duration increases 0.04 per month, less than for the first two reforms (the
increase with gradually decreasing contributions is 0.13). CDI duration decreases by 0.15
per year, whereas it increases with the first two reforms (up 0.21 with gradually decreasing
contributions).
The share of short-term contracts in total employment decreases by a modest 0.05 points,
compared with a more significant decline of 0.4 points under the other two reforms. The
higher contributions on CDDs increase the share of CDIs in total employment. However, this
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effect is offset by the decrease of CDI entry costs d1k, which raises the CDD share of total
employment.22 This result, paradoxical at first sight, is due to the fact that the reduction
in d1k costs raises the unemployment flow value and hence CDI exits. This effect is clearly
stronger than the first one. By contrast, a uniform decrease in wage contributions under
the previous reforms has only a slight impact on the share of short-term contracts in total
employment.
Owing to a higher labor-market flexibility, the reform raises productivity (by 0.14%),
unlike the first two reforms (for example, gradually decreasing contributions lower it by
0.33%). As a result, CDI wages rise 0.12% while CDD wages skilled workers shed 0.93%
because of the wider tax wedge and despite the expectation of a hiring subsidy in the wage
negotiation.
5.4 Ex post fiscal neutrality of the reforms
The reforms described above are calibrated so as to be fiscally neutral ex ante. Theoretically,
it is preferable to ensure ex post neutrality, after agents change their behavior in response
to the reform. This alternative approach yields results more sensitive to calibration, with a
multiplier effect that is channeled through the (fragile) estimate of the impact on the fiscal
balance. Moreover, it does not reflect actual practice, for reforms are calibrated on an ex
ante basis because of the uncertainty of agents’ responses to the reform.
The three reforms we have modeled generate a fiscal surplus. In ex post neutral reforms,
the tax wedge is uniformly reduced to offset the surplus. The wedge is set at 0.27 points of
the gross wage for the gradually decreasing contributions (putting the total decrease at 0.53
points), at 0.53 points for the termination tax putting the total decrease at 0.79 points),
and 0.45 points for the "Italian" reform (curtailing the rise in contributions on CDDs to 2.3
points). Taking into account the ex post constraint on the fiscal balance does not significantly
modify the results (See Table 12 in Appendix E) but leads to more favorable results in terms
of employment.
22See Table 9 in Appendix D. This table summarizes the opposite effect of an increase of the CDI entry
costs.
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6 Conclusions
This article develops a matching model whose originality is its use of two different approaches.
First, the model distinguishes between short-term and permanent jobs. Hiring under per-
manent contracts is endogenous and determined, in particular, by a stable productivity level
for the job-worker match. This level is observed during an initial job under a short-term
contract. Second, permanent job destructions are endogenous and take into account the
long-term productivity component and productivity shocks. The shocks notably reflect the
uncertainties concerning demand for the firm’s products. We perform quantitative simula-
tions based on the model’s calibration on French labor-market characteristics.
Consistently with intuition, introducing a termination tax or gradually decreasing con-
tributions reduces labor-market duality, which we can define as the share of short-term
contracts (such as CDDs, temporary work, and trial periods) in total employment or as
the share of short-term contracts converted to CDIs. However, the reduction in duality is
obtained at the price of lower labor-market flexibility and its consequences, i.e., lower labor
productivity, wages, and growth.
In keeping with the first intuition, a termination tax has a more positive effect than grad-
ually decreasing contributions on the well-being of labor-market new entrants and average
unemployment duration. These results are independent of the calibration. Our numerical
simulations show that a termination tax provides a greater stimulus to employment but
weighs on labor productivity.
The third reform we examined, inspired by the recent Italian policy, consists in an ad-
ditional contribution on short-term contracts that finances a bonus for employers who hire
a worker under a permanent contract after the short-term contract expires. Unlike the first
two reforms, the third preserves labor-market flexibility and has a positive impact on growth
and labor productivity. It diminishes labor-market duality by reducing the share of short-
term contracts leading to unemployment. However, it generates only a modest decline in the
share of short-term contracts in total employment.
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Appendix
A - Intermediate calculations and expressions of variables necessary
for results analysis
A.1 - Simplified Bellman equations
After factoring in the free-entry condition (Πvk = 0), the Bellman equations (équations (1)-
(6)) can be rewritten as follows.
Π0k = d0k +hk/mk(θk) (23)
(r+λ0k)Π0k = z0k−ρ0kw0k−λ0k [Fzk(z˜dk)c0k + (1−Fzk(z˜dk))d1k]
+λ0k
∫ ∞
z˜dk
Π1k (zd,0))dFzk(zd) (24)
(r+λ1k)Π1k (zd, ε) = zd+ ε−ρ1kw1k(zd, ε)−λ1kFεk (εk(zd))c1k
+λ1k
∫ ∞
εk(zd)
Π1k
(
zd, ε
′)dFεk(ε′) (25)
(r+ θkmk(θk))Vuk = bk + θkmk(θk)V0k (26)
(r+λ0k)V0k = w0k +λ0kFzk (z˜dk)Vuk +λ0k
∫ ∞
z˜dk
V1k (zd,0)dFzk(zd) (27)
(r+λ1k)V1k (zd, ε) = w1k(zd, ε) +λ1kFεk (εk(zd))Vuk +λ1k
∫ ∞
εk(zd)
V1k
(
zd, ε
′)dFεk(ε′)(28)
Introducing Sf0k, Se0k, S
f
1k(., .) et Se1k(., .), these equations become:
Sf0k =
hk
mk(θk)
(29)
(r+λ0k)Sf0k = z0k−ρ0kw0k−λ0k [Fzk(z˜dk)c0k + (1−Fzk(z˜dk))(d1k + c1k)]− (r+λ0k)d0k
+λ0k
∫ ∞
z˜dk
Sf1k(zd,0)dFzk(zd) (30)
(r+λ1k)Sf1k(zd, ε) = zd+ ε−ρ1kw1k(zd, ε) + rc1k +λ1k
∫ ∞
εk(zd)
Sf1k
(
zd, ε
′)dFεk(ε′) (31)
θkmk(θk)Se0k = rVuk− bk (32)
(r+λ0k)Se0k = w0k− rVuk +λ0k
∫ ∞
z˜dk
Se1k(zd,0)dFzk(zd) (33)
(r+λ1k)Se1k(zd, ε) = w1k(zd, ε)− rVuk +λ1k
∫ ∞
εk(zd)
Se1k
(
zd, ε
′)dFεk(ε′) (34)
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Defining St0k and St1k(., .) by St0k = S
f
0k+ρ0kSe0k and St1k(zd, ε) = S
f
1k(zd, ε)+ρ1kSe1k(zd, ε)
for all zd and ε values:
St0k =
hk
mk(θk)
+ ρ0k
θkmk(θk)
(rVuk− bk) (35)
(r+λ0k)St0k = z0k−λ0k [Fzk(z˜dk)c0k + (1−Fzk(z˜dk))(d1k + c1k)]− (r+λ0k)d0k
−rρ0kVuk +λ0k
[
1−γ1k +γ1k ρ0k
ρ1k
]∫ ∞
z˜dk
St1k(zd,0)dFzk(zd) (36)
(r+λ1k)St1k(zd, ε) = zd+ ε− r(ρ1kVuk− c1k) +λ1k
∫ ∞
εk(zd)
St1k
(
zd, ε
′)dFεk(ε′) (37)
A.2 - Wages
From the results of wage negotiations (7) and (8), we can deduce Equations (38)-(41).
Se0k =
γ0q
ρ0q
St0k (38)
Sf0k = (1−γ0q)St0k (39)
Se1k(zd, ε) =
γ1q
ρ1q
St1k(zd, ε), ∀zd, ε (40)
Sf1k(zd, ε) = (1−γ1q)St1k(zd, ε), ∀zd, ε (41)
(42)
From Equation (34) and using Equation (38), we obtain:
(r+λ1k)St1k(zd, ε) =
ρ1k
γ1k
(w1k(zd, ε)− rVuk) +λ1k
∫ ∞
εk(zd)
Stk
(
zd, ε
′)dFεk(ε′) (43)
Substracting from Equation (37), we obtain w1k(zd, ε) = (1−γ1k)rVuk+ γ1kρ1k (zd+ε+rc1k)
for all (zd, ε). We use the same method to calculate the wage under a short-term contract
for unskilled workers:
w0q = (1−γ0q)rVuq
+γ0q
ρ0q
{
z0q−λ0q
[
Fzq(z˜dq)c0q + (1−Fzq(z˜dq))(d1q + c1q)
]
− (r+λ0q)d0q
}
+λ0q
[
γ0q(1−γ1q)
ρ0q
− γ1q(1−γ0q)
ρ1q
]∫ ∞
z˜dk
St1k(zd,0)dFzk(zd) (44)
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A.3 - Reservation productivities for permanent hirings (CDIs) and continuation
of permanent employment
Continuation of permanent employment: Integrating Equation (37) for ε from εk(zd)
to ∞, we calculate ∫∞εk(zd)St1k(zd, ε′)dFεk(ε′) and, using (37) again, we obtain:
St1k(zd, ε) =
ε
r+λ1k
+ zd− r(ρ1kVuk− c1k)
r+λ1kFεk (εk(zd))
+ λ1k(r+λ1k)(r+λ1kFεk (εk(zd)))
∫ ∞
εk(zd)
ε′dFεk(ε′)
(45)
Using Equation (45) and the relation St1k(zd, εk(zd)) = 0, we obtain Equation (10) for job
destruction, which implicitly yields the value of εk(zd) for all zd.
The derivative of εk is
dεk
dzd
(zd) = − r+λ1kr+λ1kFεk(εk(zd)) . The partial derivative of εk(zd) is
∂εk
∂ρ1k
(zd) = r(r+λ1k)Vukr+λ1kFεk(εk(zd)) ,
∂εk
∂Vuk
(zd) = r(r+λ1k)ρ1kr+λ1kFεk(εk(zd)) and
∂εk
∂c1k
(zd) =− r(r+λ1k)r+λ1kFεk(εk(zd)) .
Using St1k(zd, εk(zd)) = 0 again, we can rewrite Equation (45) very simply:
St1k(zd, ε) =
ε− εk(zd)
r+λ1k
(46)
CDI hiring: We obtain Equation (14) directly from Equation (12) (yielding St1k(z˜dk,0) as
a function of d1k + c1k− c0k) and Equation (46) above.
A.4 - Equilibrium for skilled workers
Supply and demand equations: We derive the labor-demand equation from Equations
(29) and (36), using Equations (39) and (46) (with ε= 0). We use the same method to cal-
culate the labor-supply equation using Equations (32) and (36) and Equations (38) and (46).
When tax-wedge parameters are altered, the shifts in supply and demand curves (given
in columns 2 and 3 of Table 1) are obtained directly, except for the effect of ρ0q on labor
supply. For this, we need to rewrite the supply equation as follows:
θqmq(θq) =
(rVuq− bq)(r+λ0q)
γ0q
(
Λcq/ρ0q + Λvq
)
with Λcq and Λvq independant of ρ0q :
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
Λcq = z0q−λ0q
[
Fzq(z˜dq)c0q +
(
1−Fzq(z˜dq)
)
(d1q + c1q)
]− (r+λ0q)d0q
−λ0q(1−γ1q)r+λ1q
∫∞
z˜dq
εq(zd)dFzq(zd)
= (r+λ0q)Sf0q +ρ0qw0q > 0
Λvq = −rVuq− λ0qγ1q(r+λ1q)ρ1q
∫∞
z˜dq
εq(zd)dFzq(zd) = (r+λ0q)Se0q−w0q
Shift in θq, Vuq and z˜dq: When the comparison of shifts in supply and demand curves
enables us to deduce the direction of the Vuq variation, we ca determine whether θq is
increasing, decreasing or constant from the fact that Equations (15) and (17) yield θq =
(rVuq− bq)ρ0q(1−γ0q)/γ0q/hq.
We can also determine the impact of other variables on θq, Vuq and z˜dq. For this
purpose, we need to calculate the variablesŠ directly derivatives from the tax and social-
contribution parameters. We define Yk by Yk = t [θk,Vuk, z˜dk] and Xk be define by Xk =
t [d0k,d1k, c0k, c1k,ρ0k,ρ1k]. For skilled workers, taking the labor-demand Equation (15), the
ratio between the labor-supply and labor-demand Equations (15) and (17) and the CDI-
hiring (13), we can write MqdYq = PqdXq with:
Mq =

−ηqθq 1Λq
∂Λq
∂Vuq
1
Λq
∂Λq
∂z˜dq
− 1θq rrVuq−bq 0
0 rρ1q −1

Pq =

− 1Λq
∂Λq
∂d0q
− 1Λq
∂Λq
∂d1q
− 1Λq
∂Λq
∂c0q
− 1Λq
∂Λq
∂c1q
− 1Λq
∂Λq
∂ρ0q
− 1Λq
∂Λq
∂ρ1q
0 0 0 0 − 1ρ0q 0
0 − r+λ1qFεq(εq(z˜dq))1−γ1q
r+λ1qFεq(εq(z˜dq))
1−γ1q −
γ1qr+λ1qFεq(εq(z˜dq))
1−γ1q 0 −rVuq


∂Λq
∂Vuq
= −ρ0qr−λ0q [(1−γ1q)ρ1q +γ1qρ0q]
∫ +∞
z˜dq
rdFzq(zd)
r+λ1qFεq
(
εq(zd)
) < 0
∂Λq
∂z˜dq
= − λ0qγ1qρ0q(1−γ1q)ρ1q (d1q + c1q− c0q)fzq(z˜dq) < 0
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
∂Λq
∂d0q
= −(r+λ0q) < 0
∂Λq
∂d1q
= −λ0q(1−Fzq(z˜dq)) < 0
∂Λq
∂c0q
= −λ0qFzq(z˜dq) < 0
∂Λq
∂c1q
= −λ0q
∫ +∞
z˜dq
[
1− r
r+λ1qFεq
(
εq(zd)
) (1−γ1q +γ1q ρ0q
ρ1q
)]
dFzq(zd) < 0
∂Λq
∂ρ0q
= −rVuq− λ0qγ1q(r+λ1q)ρ1q
∫ ∞
z˜dq
εq(zd)dFzq(zd)
∂Λq
∂ρ1q
= λ0qγ1qρ0q(r+λ1q)ρ21q
∫ ∞
z˜dq
εq(zd)dFzq(zd)
−λ0qVuq
(
1−γ1q +γ1q ρ0qρ1q
)∫ ∞
z˜dq
rdFzq(zd)
r+λ1qFεq
(
εq(zd)
) < 0
We thus obtain dYqdXq par
dYq
dXq
=M−1q Pq.
M−1q =
1
detMq

− rrVuq−bq 1Λq
(
∂Λq
∂Vuq
+ rρ1q ∂Λq∂z˜dq
)
− rΛq(rVuq−bq)
∂Λq
∂z˜dq
− 1θq
ηq
θq
− 1θqΛq
∂Λq
∂z˜dq
− rρ1qθq
ηq rρ1q
θq
− ηq rθq(rVuq−bq) + 1θqΛq
∂Λq
∂Vuq

with detMq = ηq rθq(rVuq−bq) −
rρ1q
θqΛq
∂Λq
∂z˜dq
− 1θqΛq
∂Λq
∂Vuq
> 0.
The variations of the functions are summarized in Table 1. Results are taken directly
from previous equations, except for ρ0q.
For this variable, we must make an assumption about the value of ηq with respect to γ1q.
dVuq
dρ0q
= 1θqρ0q
(
ρ0q
Λq
∂Λq
∂ρ0q
−ηq
)
dz˜dq
dρ0q
= rρ1qθqρ0q
(
ρ0q
Λq
∂Λq
∂ρ0q
−ηq
)
avec :
ρ0q
Λq
∂Λq
∂ρ0q
= γ0q
(r+λ0q)Se0q−w0q
(r+λ0q)Se0q
Thus dVuqdρ0q and
dz˜dq
dρ0q
are negative if and only if ηq > γ0q
(
1− w0q(r+λ0q)Se0q
)
. We regard this
condition as being satisfied (it is met for a large window of allowed parameters). This
condition is notably met if the unemployment elasticity ηq of the matching function satisfies
the Hosios condition (ηq = γ0q, cf. Hosios (1990)).
A.5 - Equilibrium for unskilled workers
Demand and supply equations: We deduce the labor-demand equation (18) from Equa-
tions (29) and (30), using Equations (41) and (46) (with ε = 0). We use the same method
to calculate the labor-supply equation using Equations (20) using Equations (32) and (33)
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and Equations (40) and (46).
Shift in θn, Vun and z˜dn : Using Equations (13), (18) and (20), we can write MndYn =
PndXn with:
Mn =

ηn
θn
− 1
Λ(d)n
∂Λ(d)n
∂Vun
0
1−ηn
θn
1
Λ(o)n
∂Λ(o)n
∂Vun
− rrVun−bn 1Λ(o)n
∂Λ(o)n
∂z˜dn
0 rρ1n −1

Pn =

1
Λ(d)n
∂Λ(d)n
∂d0n
1
Λ(d)n
∂Λ(d)n
∂d1n
1
Λ(d)n
∂Λ(d)n
∂c0n
1
Λ(d)n
∂Λ(d)n
∂c1n
1
Λ(d)n
∂Λ(d)n
∂ρ0n
1
Λ(d)n
∂Λ(d)n
∂ρ1n
0 0 0 − 1
Λ(o)n
∂Λ(o)n
∂c1n
0 − 1
Λ(o)n
∂Λ(o)n
∂ρ1n
0 − r+λ1nFεn(εn(z˜dn))1−γ1n
r+λ1nFεn(εn(z˜dn))
1−γ1n −
γ1nr+λ1nFεn(εn(z˜dn))
1−γ1n 0 −rVun


∂Λ(d)n
∂Vun
= −λ0n(1−γ1n)ρ1n
∫ ∞
z˜dn
rdFzn(zd)
r+λ1nFεn (εn(zd))
< 0
∂Λ(o)n
∂Vun
= −r−λ0nγ1n
∫ ∞
z˜dn
rdFzn(zd)
r+λ1nFεn (εn(zd))
< 0
∂Λ(d)n
∂z˜dn
= λ0n(d1n+ c1n− c0n)fzn(z˜dn) + λ0n(1−γ1n)r+λ1n εn(z˜dn)fzn(z˜dn) = 0
∂Λ(o)n
∂z˜dn
= − λ0nγ1n(1−γ1n)ρ1n (d1n+ c1n− c0n)fzn(z˜dn) < 0

∂Λ(d)n
∂d0n
= −(r+λ0n) < 0
∂Λ(d)n
∂d1n
= −λ0n(1−Fzn(z˜dn)) < 0
∂Λ(d)n
∂c0n
= −λ0nFzn(z˜dn) < 0
∂Λ(d)n
∂c1n
= −λ0n
∫ ∞
z˜dq
[
1− r(1−γ1n)
r+λ1nFεn (εn(zd))
]
dFzq(zd) < 0
∂Λ(d)n
∂ρ0n
= −w0n < 0
∂Λ(d)n
∂ρ1n
= −λ0n(1−γ1n)Vun
∫ ∞
z˜dn
rdFzn(zd)
r+λ1nFεn(εn(z˜dn))
< 0
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
∂Λ(o)n
∂d0n
= 0
∂Λ(o)n
∂d1n
= 0
∂Λ(o)n
∂c0n
= 0
∂Λ(o)n
∂c1n
= λ0nγ1nρ1n
∫ ∞
z˜dn
rdFzn(zd)
r+λ1nFεn(εn(z˜dn))
> 0
∂Λ(o)n
∂ρ0n
= 0
∂Λ(o)n
∂ρ1n
= −λ0nγ1nρ1n
[
Vun
∫ +∞
z˜dn
rdFzn(zd)
r+λ1nFεn(εn(z˜dn))
+ 1(r+λ1n)ρ1n
∫ +∞
z˜dn
−εn(zd)Fzn(zd)
]
< 0
We thus obtain dYndXn par
dYn
dXn
=M−1n Pn.
M−1n =
1
detMn

r
rVun−bn − 1Λ(o)n
∂Λ(o)n
∂Vun
− rρ1n
Λ(o)n
∂Λ(o)n
∂z˜dn
− 1
Λ(d)n
∂Λ(d)n
∂Vun
− 1
Λ(o)n Λ
(d)
n
∂Λ(d)n
∂Vun
∂Λ(o)n
∂z˜dn
1−ηn
θn
−ηnθn −
ηn
θnΛ(o)n
∂Λ(o)n
∂z˜dn
(1−ηn)rρ1n
θn
−ηnrρ1nθn −
ηn
θn
(
r
rVun−bn − 1Λ(o)n
∂Λ(o)n
∂Vun
)
+ (1−ηn)
θnΛ(d)n
∂Λ(d)n
∂Vun

with detMn = ηnθn
(
r
rVun−bn − 1Λ(o)n
∂Λ(o)n
∂Vun
)
− ηnrρ1n
θnΛ(o)n
∂Λ(o)n
∂z˜dn
− (1−ηn)
θnΛ(d)n
∂Λ(d)n
∂Vun
> 0.
The variations of the functions are summarized in Table 2. Results are taken directly
from previous equations, except for the impact of hiring and firing costs d1n and c1n on z˜dn.
These derivatives can be rewritten as:

detM dz˜dndd1n =
(1−ηn)rλ0nρ1n
θnΛ(d)n
∫ +∞
z˜dn
λ1n [Fεn (εn(z˜dn))−Fεn (εn(zd))]dFz(zd)
r+λ1nFεn (εn(zd))
+ηn[r+λ1nFεn(εn(z˜dn))](1−γ1n)θn
(
r
rVun−bn − 1Λ(o)n
∂Λ(o)n
∂Vun
)
> 0
detM dz˜dndc1n =
(1−ηn)rλ0nρ1n
θnΛ(d)n
∫ +∞
z˜dn
λ1n [Fεn (εn(z˜dn))−Fεn (εn(zd))]dFz(zd)
r+λ1nFεn (εn(zd))
+ηnrρ1n
θnΛ(o)n
∂Λ(o)n
∂c1n
+ ηn[rγ1n+λ1nFεn(εn(z˜dn))]θn
(
r
rVun−bn − 1Λ(o)n
∂Λ(o)n
∂Vun
)
> 0
A.6 - Unemployment rate
In equilibrium, the CDD exit flow should be equal to the CDD hiring flow, i.e. λ0kl0k =
θkmk(θk)uk.
Let Gk the cumulative distribution function of the initial productivities of the current
CDIs, zd. For low values of dzd, the exit flow for initial productivities between zd and zd+dzd
44
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.61
is the approximation λ1kFεk (εk(zd))[Gk(zd + dzd)−Gk(zd)]l1k. The entry flow is equal to
λ0k[Fzk(zd+dzd)−Fzk(zd)]l0k. Let fzk and gk be the density fuctions for Fzk and Gk. We
obtain:
∀ zd > z˜dk, λ0kfzk(zd)l0k = λ1kFεk (εk(zd))gk(zd)l1k (47)
With
∫∞
z˜dk
gk(zd)dzd = 1, we deduce the relation (48):
l1k =
λ0k
λ1k
∫ ∞
z˜dk
dFzk(zd)
Fεk (εk(zd))
l0k (48)
From (48) and the previous relation between l0k and uk, we deduce l1k = θkmk(θk)λ1k
∫∞
z˜dk
dFzk(zd)
Fεk(εk(zd))
uk.
Using 1 = uk + l0k + l1k, we obtain Equation (22), which gives the unemployment rate.
A.7 - Labor Market participation
An individual decides to enter the labor market regarding on the utilities of working or not.
If she decides to enter the market, her utility is U(Vuk) where U is a growing and concave
function. If she stays inactive, her utility is U(ζ/r)+ ξ with ζ the inactivity earnings, ζ/r is
the flow value of this income and ξ the preference for leisure. ξ et ζ are random variables,
observed during the choice. Note the law of U−1 (U(ζ/r) + ξ), a priori different for each skill
level, and Ψk its cumulative distribution function. Then, Ψk(Vuk) is the rate of labor market
participation.
A.8 - Calculation of average CDI stock and CDI exit flows
Proportion of CDI employees, who have not ewperienced a productivity shock:
For given values of k and zd, we distinguish between CDI workers who did not experience a
productivity shock (they represent pik(zd) of all CDI workers), and those who did.
Between zd and zd + dzd and for a duration of dt, with low values for dzd and dt, the
number of workers who have experienced an initial productivity shock and remain in CDIs
is λ1k(1−Fεk (εk(zd)))gk(zd)l1kpik(zd)dzddt. The number of workers having undergone an
initial productivity shock and having experienced a new shock that leads to a contract
termination is approximately λ1kFεk (εk(zd))gk(zd)l1k(1−pik(zd))dzddt. At equilibrium, the
stability of the number of CDI workers having experienced a productivity shock requires
the following condition: (1−Fεk (εk(zd)))pik(zd) = Fεk (εk(zd))(1−pik(zd)). Wz deduce that
pik(zd) = Fεk (εk(zd)).
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Cumulative distribution functions Gk of initial productivities: From Equations(47)
and (48), it follows that the density gk of CDI initial productivities is given by:
gk(zd) =
fzk(zd)
Fεk(k(zd))∫∞
z˜dk
dFzk(zd)
Fεk(εk(zd))
pour zd ∈ [z˜dk,+∞[ (49)
Average CDI productivity: Distinguishing between CDI workers before and after a
productivity shock and using pik(zd) = Fεk (εk(zd)), we obtain:
ECDIk [z|zd] = zd+
∫ ∞
εk(zd)
εdFε(ε)
In practice, with Fεk uniform on [εmink ,0], we obtain
∫∞
εk(zd) εdFεk(ε) =
∫ 0
εk(zd)
εdε
−εmink
=
(1−Fεk (εk(zd)))εk(zd)2 , yielding:
ECDIk [z|zd] = zd+ (1−Fεk (εk(zd)))
εk(zd)
2
Average CDI productiviy is logically given by:
ECDIk [z] =
∫ ∞
z˜dk
ECDIk [z|zd]dGk(zd)
Average CDI wage and average wage at CDI termination: Using w1k(zd, ε) = (1−
γ1k)rVuk + γ1kρ1k (zd+ ε+ rc1k) (cf. Appendix A.2), we calculate the average CDI wage:
ECDIk [w] = (1−γ1k)rVuk +
γ1k
ρ1k
(
ECDIk [z] + rc1k
)
Moreover, ECDIk [w|zd] = (1−γ1k)rVuk + γ1kρ1k
(
zd+
∫∞
εk(zd) εdFεk(ε) + rc1k
)
.
To calculate the average wage at the end of a CDI (needed to calibrate unemployment
benefits bk and the firing costs c1k), we note that Efin CDIk [w|zd] = ECDIk [w|zd]. As CDI exit
and entry flows are equal, the cumulative distribution function of zd is identical for the both
flows. Hence:
Efin CDIk [w] =
∫ ∞
z˜dk
ECDIk [w|zd]
dFz(zd)
1−Fz(z˜dk)
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B - Calibration
B.1 - Measurement of labor market flows
We estimate labor-market flows from the French labor-force survey (LFS: in French, Enquête
Emploi), used as a quarterly panel. Individuals are classified by skill level, using the standard
French socio-occupational categories: "skilled workers" comprise executives, higher intellec-
tual occupations, and intermediate occupations; other categories are classified as "unskilled
workers." We also classify individuals by employment status: CDI (after the trial period),
CDD (short term contracts and CDI during the trial period), unemployed, and inactive.
Workers in a trial period are identified as CDI workers with less than 3 months’ tenure.
All job changes away from CDIs are treated as transitions from the CDI category to the
CDD category.
We consider that an individual’s state is defined by a Markov chain, which supposes the
absence of memory effects in the transition probabilities.
For each skill level k and on average during the 2003-2011 period, we calculate the
state-transitions matrix T 1/4k by quarter. Using this matrix, we calculate the stationnary
distribution ωk (which is close to the proportion observed in the LFS in 2003-2011) and the
generator matrix Γk of the Markov process, with T
1/4
k = exp(−Γk/4) (cf. Table 4). Indexes
(i, j) of matrix Γk, for i 6= j, correspond to the parameter of the exponential law for the
transition from state i to state j. The diagonal terms are defined by (Γk)ii =−∑j 6=i(Γk)ij .
Table 4: Transition probabilities before reprocessing (matrixes Γk)
Skilled workers Unskilled workers
PPPPPPPPPfrom. . .
to. . . In
ac
tiv
ity
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
C
D
D
C
D
I PPPPPPPPPfrom. . .
to. . . In
ac
tiv
ity
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
C
D
D
C
D
I
Inactivity -0.15 0.08 0.05 0.02 Inactivity -0.15 0.09 0.05 0.01
Unemployment 0.88 -2.14 1.25 0.01 Unemployment 0.89 -2.07 1.17 0.02
CDD 0.23 0.39 -1.39 0.77 CDD 0.28 0.65 -1.52 0.58
CDI 0.05 0.02 0.03 -0.10 CDI 0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.15
Next, we need to reprocess the generator matrixes to allow for the fact that some flows
cannot occur in the model framework. These flows need to be constrained by treating them
as transitions through one or more intermediate states. For instance, we consider that an
observed transition from a CDI to a CDD corresponds in the model to an initial transition
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to unemployment followed by a second transition to a CDD. In this framework, all flows
between the modelŠs scope of coverage and the "out-of-scope" status (economic inactivity) go
through the unemployment state.23 For entries into the model’s scope, our choice reflects the
fact that all transitions into (payroll) employment necessarily involve a job-seeking period,
however brief. By contrast, for exits from the model, our choice enables us to capture all exits
from employment. In particular, if we were to ignore exits to retirement, we would greatly
underestimate CDI exit rates and therefore estimate average CDI durations inconsistent
with reality. Our modeling choice implies shorter unemployement spells than in reality. This
reflects the fact that, in the framework of our model, exits from unemployment encompass
all successful job searches, including those that do not entail an actual unemployment spell
in the strict sense.
In practice, we reprocess the matrixes as follows. First, we weight the Γk lines by the
stationary distribution ωk. The matrix obtained is written (ωkΓk). During a short period dt,
the value of the flow from the state i to the state j (j 6= j) is (ωkΓk)ijdt. If this transition is
not possible in the model framework and needs to pass through the intermediary state e, the
reprocessing of the matrix (ωkΓk) involves setting the coefficient (i, j) to 0, adding (ωkΓk)ij
to the coefficients (i,e) and (e,j) and substracting (ωkΓk)ij from the coefficient (e,e). The
reprocessing matrix Γˆk is calculated by linking the lines of the processed matrix ˆ(ωkΓk) to
the stationnary distribution ωk.
The matrix Γˆk (See Table 5) also give the transition probabilities in continuous time
from one state to another (parameters of exponential laws). For instance, the duration of
the transition from unemployment to CDD for a skilled worker follows an exponential law
of parameter 2.58, which represents an average unemployment duration of 5 months.
23The reprocessing thus consists of the following operations:
• CDI→CDD = CDI→unemployment + unemployement→CDD
• unemployment→CDI = unemployment→CDD + CDD→CDI
• inactivity→CDD = inactivity→unemployment + unemployment→CDD
• inactivity→CDI = inactivity→unemployment + unemployment→CDD+ CDD→CDI
• CDD→inactivity = CDD→unemployment + unemployment→inactivity
• CDI→inactivity = CDI→unemployment + unemployment→inactivity.
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Table 5: Transition probabilities after reprocessing (matrixes Γˆk)
Skilled workers Unskilled workers
PPPPPPPPPde. . .
vers. . . In
ac
tiv
ity
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
C
D
D
C
D
I PPPPPPPPPde. . .
vers. . . In
ac
tiv
ity
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
C
D
D
C
D
I
Inactivity -0.15 0.15 0 0 Inactivity -0.15 0.15 0 0
Unemployment 2.00 -4.59 2.58 0 Unemployement 1.66 -3.75 2.09 0
CDD 0 0.62 -1.52 0.90 CDD 0 0.94 -1.64 0.70
CDI 0 0.10 0 -0.10 CDI 0 0.15 0 -0.15
B.2 - Calibration
After arbitrarily choosing the hk and setting the z0k values in the interval [zmindk , zmaxdk ],
nodegrees of freedom remain in the model. The reason is that five parameters need to be
determined in each labor market: λ1k, zmindk , εmink andM0k, as well as w0n for unskilled work-
ers and γ0q for skilled workers. These five parameters must comply with the following five
constraints: average CDI and CDD wage rate, average unemployment duration, average CDI
duration, CDI tenure, and proportion of CDDs converted to CDIs. These five parameters
are obtained by numerical optimization.
However, d1k, c1k and bk are known only conditional upon CDI entry and exit wages. In
practice, we determine these three parameters determined by iteration. Their values quickly
converge in two or three steps.
We arbitrarily set zmaxdq to 1. We then take all variables relating to skilled workers and
fit them proportionally to ensure that the average-wage ratio between skilled and unskilled
workers matches the LFS observations.
The parameters and the model equilibrium are summarized in Tables 6, 7 and 8 of
Appendix C.
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C - Model parameters and simulations
Table 6: Model parameters
Variable Unskilled workers Skilled workers
CDD hiring costs d0k 0 0
CDI hiring costs d1k 0.021 0.039
CDD dismissal costs c0k 0 0
CDI dismissal costs c1k 0.28 0.52
CDD tax wedge ρ0k 1.74 2.06
CDI tax wedge ρ1k 2.02 2.15
CDD termination probability λ0k 1.64 1.52
CDI productivity-shock probability λ1k 0.40 0.26
Constant factor of matching function M0k 3.36 2.48
Unemployment elasticity of matching function ηk 0.3 0.3
CDD productivity z0k 0.63 1.30
Minimal productivity when CDI extended zmindk 0.47 1.13
Maximal productivity when CDI extended zmaxdk 1 1.70
Lower bound of productivity shocks mink -0.78 -1.07
Cost of a vacancy hk 1 1.70
Unemployment benefits bk 0.20 0.32
CDD bargaining power γ0k - 0.19
CDI bargaining power γ1k 0.4 0.4
Wage under CDD w0k 0.24 -
Interest rate r 4 %
Constant factor of labor supply Ψ0k 0.29 0.34
Labor-supply elasticity µk 0.2 0.2
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Table 7: Equilibrium of each labor market
Variable Unskilled workers Skilled workers
Unemployment flow value Vuk 7.3 13.2
Reservation productivity for CDI hiring z˜dk 0.77 1.36
Labor-market tightness θk 0.51 1.06
Average unemployment duration (months) 1/(θkmk(θk)) 5.8 4.7
Average CDI duration (years) 6.9 9.6
Unemployment rate (% of working population) uk 11.9 5.8
Employment rate (ditto) l0k + l1k 88.1 94.2
CDD employment rate (ditto) l0k 15.1 9.7
CDI employment rate (ditto) l1k 73.0 84.5
CDD average net wage* w0k 0.24 0.34
CDD average productivity z0k 0.63 1.30
CDI average net wage* w1k 0.33 0.58
CDI average productivity z1k 0.75 1.37
Average net wage* 0.31 0.55
Average productivity 0.73 1.36
Net unemployment benefits* (e/month) 824 1 343
CDD average net wage* (ditto) 980 1 428
CDI average net wage* (ditto) 1 350 2 388
Average net wage* (ditto) 1 287 2 288
CDI hiring cost (in euros) 1 065 1 947
CDI dismissal cost (ditto) 13 772 25 753
Number of unemployed (million) 1.9 0.6
Number of CDD workers (ditto) 2.4 1.0
Number of CDI workers (ditto) 11.8 9.1
Working population (ditto) Nk 16.2 10.7
* Net wages and benefits are calculated after taxes, including VAT.
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Table 8: Main macro-economic agregates
Value
GDP (ebn/year) 1937
Workers compensation (ditto) 1033
Gross payroll* (ditto) 760
Net payroll* (ditto) 498
Working population, excluding self-employed workers (million) 26.9
Number of unemployed (ditto) 2.5
Number of CDD workers (ditto) 3.5
Number of CDI workers (ditto) 20.9
*Net wages are calculated after tax, including VTA. Gross wages exclude employer
contributions but include employee contributions.
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Table 9: Impact of a hiring tax. . . (equal to 0.1% of GDP)
. . . on CDD . . . on CDI
. . . on all
contract
U
ns
ki
lle
d
w
or
ke
rs
Vun -0.020 -0.024 -0.022
Fzn(z˜dn) (%) -0.30 +0.83 +0.20
Average unemployment duration (months) +0.23 +0.13 +0.19
Average CDI duration (years) +0.23 +0.39 +0.30
un (% of working population) +0.07 -0.07 +0.01
l0n (ditto) -0.50 -0.43 -0.47
l1n (ditto) +0.43 +0.50 +0.46
CDD hirings (ditto) -0.82 -0.70 -0.77
CDI hirings (ditto) -0.28 -0.50 -0.38
Productivity (%) -0.49 -0.64 -0.56
Sk
ill
ed
w
or
ke
rs
Vuq -0.019 -0.034 -0.025
Fzq(z˜dq) (%) -0.28 +0.83 +0.21
Average unemployment duration (months) +0.01 +0.02 +0.02
Average CDI duration (years) +0.11 +0.30 +0.19
uq (% of working population) -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
l0q (ditto) -0.13 -0.14 -0.13
l1q (ditto) +0.19 +0.20 +0.19
CDD hirings (ditto) -0.20 -0.21 -0.21
CDI hirings (ditto) -0.08 -0.25 -0.15
Productivity (%) -0.18 -0.31 -0.24
E
co
no
m
y
Average unemployment duration (months) +0.17 +0.10 +0.14
Average CDI duration (years) +0.20 +0.37 +0.27
Unemployment rate (% of working population) +0.02 -0.06 -0.02
CDD employment rate (ditto) -0.36 -0.32 -0.34
CDI employment rate (ditto) +0.30 +0.33 +0.31
CDD hirings (ditto) -0.59 -0.52 -0.56
CDI hirings (ditto) -0.20 -0.41 -0.29
Average CDD net wage (%) -0.21 -0.17 -0.20
Average CDI net wage (%) -0.34 -0.47 -0.39
Employment (thousands) -15 +3 -8
Pay roll (%) -0.23 -0.29 -0.26
CDI productivity (%) -0.46 -0.62 -0.27
Productivity (%) -0.29 -0.45 -0.12
Value added (%) -0.35 -0.44 -0.39
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) +0.03 +0.02 +0.03
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Table 10: Impact of a termination tax. . . (equal to 0.1% of GDP)
. . . on CDD . . . on CDI
. . . on all
contract
U
ns
ki
lle
d
w
or
ke
rs
Vun -0.013 -0.020 -0.017
Fzn(z˜dn) (%) -1.45 +0.79 -0.11
Average unemployment duration (months) +0.30 +0.12 +0.20
Average CDI duration (years) +0.04 +0.41 +0.25
un (% of working population) +0.20 -0.12 +0.02
l0n (ditto) -0.52 -0.46 -0.48
l1n (ditto) +0.32 +0.59 +0.47
CDD hirings (ditto) -0.85 -0.76 -0.79
CDI hirings (ditto) -0.02 -0.52 -0.31
Productivity (%) -0.29 -0.68 -0.51
Sk
ill
ed
w
or
ke
rs
Vuq -0.006 -0.027 -0.018
Fzq(z˜dq) (%) -1.28 +0.81 -0.04
Average unemployment duration (months) +0.00 +0.02 +0.01
Average CDI duration (years) -0.05 +0.32 +0.16
uq (% of working population) -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
l0q (ditto) -0.13 -0.16 -0.14
l1q (ditto) +0.20 +0.23 +0.21
CDD hirings (ditto) -0.20 -0.24 -0.22
CDI hirings (ditto) +0.07 -0.26 -0.12
Productivity (%) -0.08 -0.33 -0.23
E
co
no
m
y
Average unemployment duration (months) +0.21 +0.09 +0.14
Average CDI duration (years) +0.01 +0.39 +0.23
Unemployment rate (% of working population) +0.09 -0.10 -0.02
CDD employment rate (ditto) -0.37 -0.35 -0.35
CDI employment rate (ditto) +0.25 +0.41 +0.34
CDD hirings (ditto) -0.60 -0.56 -0.57
CDI hirings (ditto) +0.01 -0.42 -0.24
Average CDD net wage (%) -0.29 -0.16 -0.22
Average CDI net wage (%) -0.19 -0.44 -0.33
Employment (thousands) -30 +16 -4
Pay roll (%) -0.17 -0.19 -0.19
CDI productivity (%) -0.27 -0.67 -0.50
Productivity (%) -0.12 -0.49 -0.33
Value added (%) -0.24 -0.43 -0.35
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) +0.05 +0.05 +0.05
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Table 11: Impact of an increase in the tax wedge. . . (equal to 0.1% of GDP)
. . . on CDD . . . on CDI
. . . on all
contract
U
ns
ki
lle
d
w
or
ke
rs
Vun -0.019 -0.012 -0.012
Fzn(z˜dn) (%) -0.29 +0.06 +0.02
Average unemployment duration (months) +0.22 +0.02 +0.04
Average CDI duration (years) +0.21 -0.04 -0.02
un (% of working population) +0.07 +0.10 +0.10
l0n (ditto) -0.47 +0.07 +0.02
l1n (ditto) +0.40 -0.16 -0.12
CDD hirings (ditto) -0.78 +0.11 +0.03
CDI hirings (ditto) -0.27 +0.03 +0.01
Productivity (%) -0.47 +0.08 +0.04
Sk
ill
ed
w
or
ke
rs
Vuq -0.023 -0.022 -0.022
Fzq(z˜dq) (%) -0.34 +0.06 +0.02
Average unemployment duration (months) -0.05 +0.01 +0.01
Average CDI duration (years) +0.13 -0.02 -0.01
uq (% of working population) -0.15 +0.03 +0.02
l0q (ditto) -0.15 +0.03 +0.01
l1q (ditto) +0.30 -0.06 -0.02
CDD hirings (ditto) -0.23 +0.04 +0.01
CDI hirings (ditto) -0.09 +0.01 +0.00
Productivity (%) -0.22 +0.04 +0.01
E
co
no
m
y
Average unemployment duration (months) +0.14 +0.02 +0.03
Average CDI duration (years) +0.19 -0.03 -0.01
Unemployemnt rate (% of working population) -0.02 +0.07 +0.06
CDD employment rate (ditto) -0.35 +0.05 +0.01
CDI employment rate (ditto) +0.33 -0.15 -0.11
CDD hirings (ditto) -0.57 +0.08 +0.02
CDI hirings (ditto) -0.20 +0.02 +0.00
Average CDD net wage (%) -0.52 -0.00 -0.06
Average CDI net wage (%) -0.33 -0.13 -0.14
Employment (thousands) -6 -27 -26
Pay roll (%) -0.21 -0.26 -0.25
CDI productivity (%) -0.44 +0.10 +0.05
Value added (%) -0.31 -0.04 -0.07
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) +0.05 +0.01 +0.02
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Table 12: Ex post balanced reforms
decreasing
contrib.
termination
tax
Italian style
U
ns
ki
lle
d
w
or
ke
rs
Vun +0.006 +0.022 +0.027
Fzn(z˜dn) (%) -0.35 -0.19 -1.17
Average unemployment duration (months) +0.15 +0.07 +0.01
Average CDI duration (years) +0.27 +0.32 -0.12
un (% of working population) -0.14 -0.30 -0.06
l0n (ditto) -0.55 -0.56 -0.10
l1n (ditto) +0.69 +0.86 +0.16
CDD hirings (ditto) -0.91 -0.92 -0.17
CDI hirings (ditto) -0.31 -0.35 +0.21
Productivity (%) -0.58 -0.65 +0.08
Sk
ill
ed
w
or
ke
rs
Vuq +0.028 +0.052 +0.051
Fzq(z˜dq) (%) -0.33 -0.10 -1.23
Average unemployment duration (months) -0.00 -0.01 -0.09
Average CDI duration (years) +0.12 +0.19 -0.14
uq (% of working population) -0.09 -0.12 -0.13
l0q (ditto) -0.15 -0.17 -0.03
l1q (ditto) +0.24 +0.29 +0.16
CDD hirings (ditto) -0.23 -0.26 -0.05
CDI hirings (ditto) -0.09 -0.14 +0.15
Productivity (%) -0.21 -0.27 +0.05
E
co
no
m
y
Average unemployment duration (in month) +0.10 +0.04 -0.02
Average CDI duration (in year) +0.23 +0.28 -0.13
Unemployment rate (in % of working population) -0.12 -0.23 -0.08
CDD employment rate (ditto) -0.39 -0.40 -0.07
CDI employment rate (ditto) +0.53 +0.68 +0.22
CDD hirings (ditto) -0.63 -0.64 -0.11
CDI hirings (ditto) -0.22 -0.26 +0.20
Average CDD net wage (%) -0.09 -0.03 -0.24
Average CDI net wage (%) -0.04 +0.10 +0.38
Employment (thousands) +39 +77 +41
Pay roll (%) +0.29 +0.61 +0.53
CDI productivity (%) -0.57 -0.67 +0.05
Productivity (%) -0.37 -0.46 +0.07
Value added (%) -0.21 -0.15 +0.24
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
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